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The rallying cry of the environmental justice movement has
been its leaders' claim that minority and poor communities
throughout the United States have been forced to bear more than
their share of the environmental burdens that accompany the toxic
by-products of our industrialized society. In this article, Professor
Lynn Blais argues that the literature generated by environmental
justice advocates has failed to advance a coherent theory of why
the current distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses,
even if disproportionate, should be considered unfair. In making
her argument, Professor Blais addresses two major claims made
by those in the environmental justice movement: (1) that the
political decision-making process distributes environmentally
sensitive land uses in a manner that disproportionately impacts
minority and poor communities because of distortions arising
from race and class disempowerment, and (2) that market failures
drive the placement of sites in such a manner that land uses
disproportionately affect low-income or minority communities.
The author develops a framework under which the political and
market determinations leading to distribution can be understood
to accurately reflect rational and legitimate private preferences
and collective judgments. After evaluating possible market and
political failures that could justify extensive interference with
revealed preferences in the context of environmentally sensitive
land uses, Professor Blais concludes that any disparate impacts
that may exist are most likely attributable to the dramatic
inequality of wealth that characterizes contemporary America.
Finally, Professor Blais suggests that most of the reforms
proposed by environmental justice advocates may leave poor and
minority communities worse off, because the proposals fail to
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address the cultural conditions that constrain economic options
for such communities and their residents.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The civil rights movement has placed a new item on its agenda.
In addition to their continued crusade against discrimination in the
labor force, workplace, housing market, and education sector, civil
rights leaders have turned their attention to the claim that racial mi-
norities suffer a disproportionately high risk of being exposed to
environmental hazards.' In particular, the environmental justice
movement is premised on the belief that racism and classism improp-
erly influence the distribution of environmental risks in the United
States. Accordingly, advocates of environmental justice seek funda-
mental changes in the structure of environmental decision-making to
eliminate this improper influence.
The origin of the environmental justice movement is often traced
to the 1982 uprising in Afton, North Carolina.2 Afton was a pre-
dominantly African-American low-income community with a
disproportionately high rate of unemployment When the State of
1. Lawyers and legal scholars entered the environmental justice debate long after
professionals in other fields had turned their attention to these issues. See, e.g., Pat Bry-
ant, Toxics and Racial Justice, 20 SOc. POL'Y 48 (1989); Robert D. Bullard, Solid Waste
Sites and the Black Houston Community, 53 Soc. INQUIRY 273 (1983) [hereinafter
Bullard, Solid Waste Sites]; David Kallick, The Struggle for Community: Race, Class, and
the Environment, 21 SOC. POL'Y 18 (1990).
2. Professor Robert Bullard, an early leader in the quest for environmental justice,
writes: "The environmental justice movement took shape out of the 1982 protests in
Warren County, North Carolina." Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice For All, in
UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 5, 5
(Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994).
3. See ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL QUALITY 36 (1990) [hereinafter BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE].
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North Carolina decided to dump 32,000 cubic yards of soil contami-
nated by polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in a landfill in Afton,4
local and national civil rights leaders, African-American elected offi-
cials, environmental activists, and labor leaders orchestrated
demonstrations opposing the site. More than 500 people were ar-
rested during the demonstrations! The rallying cry of the protests
was the perception that African-American and poor communities
throughout the United States are made to bear a disproportionately
high share of the burdens associated with to the toxic by-products of
our industrialized economy. Although generally credited with initi-
ating the environmental justice movement, the civil disobedience in
Afton did not succeed in keeping the unwanted landfill out of the
city. The participants did, however, claim some success in limiting
the uses of the landfill.6
The Afton uprising spawned a succession of studies undertaken
to evaluate the assertion that hazardous waste sites are dispropor-
tionately located in minority and/or low-income communities Most
of those early studies purport to confirm these suspicions, concluding,
in general, that both the racial composition and the average income
level of communities are statistically significant predictors of the
placement of environmentally sensitive land uses.8 The early studies,
in turn, generated a spate of academic literature condemning the ra-
cism of environmental decision-making, and calling for legal and
political responses to the inequitable distribution of environmentally
sensitive land uses. The Clinton Administration responded by re-
4. Polychlorinated biphenyls are highly toxic compounds, and are members of the
same chemical family as DDT and Dioxin. See Ken Geiser & Gerry Waneck, PCBs and
Warren County, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COM-
MUNIrlES OF COLOR, supra note 2, at 44-46.
5. See COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, Toxic
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL
AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS
WASTE SITES 2 (1987) [hereinafter CRJ REPORT].
6. See Charles Lee, Toxic Waste and Race in the United States, in RACE AND THE
INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE 10, 12 (Bunyan
Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992).
7. See, e.g., CRJ REPORT, supra note 5; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL
AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983) [hereinafter GAO
STUDY].
8. Many environmental racism/justice scholars refer to the challenged land uses as
"locally undesirable land uses" or "LULUs." Because this Article questions the accuracy
of the assumption that all of the challenged land uses are undesirable in every locality
(particularly in the community in which they are located), I prefer the term
"environmentally sensitive land use."
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quiring federal agencies to consider the possibility of disproportion-
ate siting of environmentally sensitive land uses in every decision in
which the issue might be relevant.9 State and local governments also
joined ranks, commissioning studies to reveal the racism, if any, in
their environmental decision-making processes and pledging to ame-
liorate the discriminatory effects of prior decisions."
The contemporary environmental justice movement is both
broader and more narrow than the mischief that gave it birth. In its
current form, its proponents challenge the allegedly disproportionate
impact of a vast array of decisions in addition to those concerning the
siting of environmental risks, the promulgation of environmental
laws and regulations, and the enforcement of those laws (in particu-
lar, the speed with which federally mandated clean-ups are
undertaken at toxic sites pursuant to CERCLA). For example,
charges of environmental racism have been leveled at such issues as
the continued availability of unsafe housing," effects of occupational
injury and illness on minorities," and land use decisions concerning
the placement of low-income housing, drug rehabilitation centers,
group homes, prisons, and even farms.' At the same time, however,
many environmental equity advocates have downplayed the effect of
income on exposure to environmental hazards, focusing most of their
attention on perceived racial bias. 4
9. In February 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898 requiring all
federal agencies to incorporate environmental justice concerns into their decision-making
processes to the extent practicable and permitted by law. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3
C.F.R. 859 (1994), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (West 1994). For further discussion of
the Executive Order, see infra text accompanying notes 69-71.
10. As of late 1995, "[Imlore than a dozen states either ha[d] passed legislation relat-
ing to the distribution of noxious facilities or ha[d] such legislation pending." Vicki Been,
Environmental Justice and Equity Issues, in ZONING AND LjND USE CONTROLS
§ 25D.06[3] (R. Rohan ed., 1996) (summarizing the existing and proposed legislation)
[hereinafter Been, Environmental Justice]; see also infra text accompanying notes 70-76.
11. See Donald E. Lively, The Diminishing Relevance of Rights: Racial Disparities in
the Distribution of Lead Exposure Risks, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 309 (1994); see
also Luke R Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 622 (1992) ("[T]hat the poor suffer
disproportionately from environmental hazards is confirmed in local and national studies
of the impacts of toxics production and disposal, garbage dumps, air pollution, lead poi-
soning, pesticides, occupational hazards, noise pollution and rat bites.") (citations
omitted) [hereinafter Cole, Empowerment].
12. See Beverly Hendrix Wright, The Effects of Occupational Injury, Illness, and Dis-
ease on the Health Status of Black Americans, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 114 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992).
13. See Been, Environmental Justice, supra note 10, § 25D.02[2][c].
14. But see Cole, Empowerment, supra note 11, at 619, 622 ("[T]hat the poor suffer
disproportionately from environmental hazards is confirmed in local and national studies
1996]
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Professor Vicki Been has discussed one way in which the calls
for environmental equity fail to advance a coherent concept of
"fairness" in the context of siting environmentally sensitive land uses.
In her 1993 article titled What's Fairness Got to Do With It?," Profes-
sor Been carefully examines each of the plausible theories of "fair"
siting of environmentally sensitive land uses, and concludes that all of
them "encounter significant philosophical and pragmatic objec-
tions."'6  For example, calling for proportional geographic
distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses among
"neighborhoods" ignores the rights of the individuals in the neigh-
borhood, some of whom will necessarily be closer to the challenged
land use than will others, to "fair" distribution of environmentally
sensitive land uses." Such a conception of fairness also embraces the
implausible assumption that all land is equally suited to host an envi-
ronmentally sensitive land use, or that we should ignore geological
and geographical suitability in siting environmentally sensitive land
uses. Clearly, no serious advances can be made in the attempt to pur-
sue environmental equity until a conception of equitable distribution
is crystallized.
This Article explores a different, but no less disabling, theoreti-
cal flaw in the call for environmental justice. While it is clear that
many scholars and advocates argue that the current distribution of
environmentally sensitive land uses is in some way "unfair" and that
the distribution should be made "more fair," the literature presents
no coherent theory about why the current distribution-even if dis-
proportionate' 8 -should be considered unfair. Viewed critically, the
charge of environmental racism ultimately distills to one of three al-
legations. The most damning claim that advocates could be making is
that the environmental decision-making process is regularly tainted
by intentional discrimination against people of color or those in low-
income brackets. The second possible claim might be that the politi-
cal decision-making process, because of distortions relating to and
15. Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1001 (1993) [hereinafter
Been, Fairness].
16. Id. at 1006.
17. See id. at 1032.
18. Professor Richard Markovits suggests that the term "disproportionate" connotes
a lack of fairness, and that a more appropriate word for my purposes would be
"differential." While he may be correct, the environmental racism literature is so satu-
rated with the phrase "disproportionate impact" that it has become, in a sense, a term of




arising out of race and class disempowerment, regularly distributes
environmentally sensitive land uses in a manner that disproportion-
ately impacts minority and poor communities. Finally,
environmental justice advocates may be arguing that market forces
(themselves not untainted by discriminatory instincts and certainly
affected by class differences) drive either the placement of environ-
mentally sensitive land uses or the subsequent migration of low-
income or minority residents in such a manner that those land uses
disproportionately affect low-income or minority communities. Be-
cause decisions pertaining to the siting of environmentally sensitive
land uses are made in circumstances in which the economic and po-
litical forces interact, scholars and advocates making the second or
third allegation would generally have to incorporate components of
both.
This Article addresses only the second and third types of envi-
ronmental racism claimnincluding the various combinations of these
two-for several reasons. First, political and private officials who
make siting decisions are rarely accused of engaging in intentional,
consistent race discrimination. Certainly, none of the empirical
studies is able to demonstrate any such invidious discrimination, as
the analyses suggest, at most, correlations between the location of
environmentally sensitive uses and the size of the minority and/or
poor population in a given community. Second, if intentional race-
based discrimination existed and could be proved, the siting decisions
clearly would be unconstitutional to the extent that they involve state
action, and likely would be illegal to the extent that they do not. Fi-
nally, it appears that the most difficult legal and policy questions
arise as a result of the allegations in the second and third categories.
Although the environmental racism movement conveys a simple
story of discrimination, the reality of the siting of environmentally
sensitive land uses is much more complex. At some point, and at
some level, representatives of host communities make political and
market-based determinations to permit the challenged sitings. In ad-
dition, the residents of these communities have made decisions either
to remain in the community after the challenged use was sited, or, in
many cases, to migrate to a community playing host to such a land
use. In such circumstances, it is not clear why these preferences are
more suspect than the myriad of others that emerge from the political
and market system. Indeed, it is quite plausible that the communities
and residents are better off, given the constrained positions from
which they enter the market and/or the political process, with the
challenged uses than they were without them. This possibility spawns
1]996]
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many complex questions: Does a careful analysis of the implicated
market and political processes reveal systematic process failures that
might be responsible for the inaccurate revelation of preferences? If
so, should society regulate or manipulate the political process or the
market to ameliorate the process failures in this context? If we can
feel confident that the current distribution of benefits and burdens
from environmentally sensitive uses does reflect the true preferences
of the host communities and their residents, should society nonethe-
less reject those preferences? On what grounds? Finally, what are
the costs of possible intervention strategies and who will/should bear
those costs?
This Article lays the groundwork for a more rigorous evaluation
of the market and political forces that may have resulted in the ex-
isting distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses, and the
consequences of rejecting expressed preferences in this context. In
Part II, I set the stage by providing a brief overview of the develop-
ment of environmental equity literature. The early environmental
justice movement drew credence from several influential studies, the
results of which have now been called into question. Moreover, evi-
dence is emerging that such demographic factors as income level,
educational attainment, and propensity for political participation may
be more significant predictors of the placement or expansion of envi-
ronmentally sensitive land uses than is race. As a result, many of the
early reform proposals appear to be tethered to an unrealistic under-
standing of the political and market forces underlying the current
distribution of environmental burdens.
In light of the persistent uncertainty concerning the interplay of
race, class, and the distribution of environmental burdens, I begin the
inquiry into environmental justice anew in Part III. I first review the
general theories under which we rely on the market and political
process to allocate and distribute most resources in conformity with
measured individual and community preferences. I then develop a
basic theoretical framework under which a community decision to act
as host for an environmentally sensitive land use, or a private deter-
mination to live near one, can be viewed as rational and informed,
and the political and market determinations leading to the current
distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses can be understood
to accurately reflect rational and legitimate private preferences and
collective judgments. In so doing, I differentiate among types of
challenged uses, categorizing uses according to whether they merely
involve unpleasant environmental impacts or potential hazards to
human health, and whether they provide a concomitant benefit to the
[Vol. 75
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community, such as an increased property tax base or potential jobs,
or simply burden the community with no attendant benefit. I also
differentiate among residents of host communities according to clas-
sifications that have more theoretical relevance to the issue of
environmental burdens and benefits than does race. Such classifica-
tions include homeowner status and job status, among others.
Finally, I provide three examples of siting decisions or community
transformations that appear consistent with this theoretical frame-
work.
In Part IV, I take a step back, asking whether conventional justi-
fications for rejecting market and political choices undermine our
confidence in the conclusions reached in Part III. In this section, I
explore the possibility that extensive process failures, both market-
based and political, might call into question the accuracy or accept-
ability of the choices underlying the distribution of environmentally
sensitive land uses. In addition, I review the general circumstances in
which allocative and distributive decisions are removed from the
market or the political process entirely, and examines whether the
choices underlying the current distribution of environmentally sensi-
tive land uses conform to these circumstances. Ultimately, I conclude
that while disquieting vestiges of social injustice remain in our soci-
ety, no convincing argument has been made for rejecting measured
preferences concerning environmentally sensitive land uses under
these circumstances.
Finally, in Part V, I explain why many of the proposed or en-
acted environmental equity reforms will either be of questionable
value to their intended beneficiaries or may actually make residents
of potential host communities worse off than they would have been
without the reforms.
II. THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DEBATE
While environmental racism claims and the pleas of the many
environmental justice advocates are obviously diverse, some gener-
alizations are possible and useful. First, claims of environmental
racism tend to focus on the siting of environmentally sensitive land
uses and the distribution of other environmental risks, 9 and, less fre-
quently, on the disparate enforcement of environmental protection
19. See Vicki Been, Analyzing Evidence of Environmental Justice, 11 J. LAND USE &
ENvrL. L. 1, 1 (1995) ("The movement ... focuses on the distributional implications of
the way in which our society seeks to manage environmental threats and improve and
protect environmental quality.") [hereinafter Been, Analyzing Evidence].
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statutes." Second, pleas for environmental justice call, for the most
part, for one or more of the following reforms: a prohibition on (or
presumption against) the siting of environmentally sensitive land uses
in areas that are host to more than their "proportionate" share of
such facilities; enhancement of the information and participation op-
tions available to residents of potential host communities; increased
support for grassroots organizational efforts in affected communities
to resist additional sitings; and more equal environmental enforce-
ment efforts across diverse communities.1
A. The Siting of Environmentally Sensitive Land Uses
The Afton uprising spawned a nationwide concern that minority
and poor communities were being disproportionately affected by the
placement of environmentally sensitive land uses. This concern, in
turn, led researchers to study that claim more methodically.' Many
of these early studies appeared to substantiate the claims of dispro-
portionate impact, lending "substantial credibility' 'n to the
environmental justice movement. For example, a 1987 study by the
Commission for Racial Justice (CRJ) found a significant correlation
between the number of commercial hazardous waste facilities in a
community (defined by zip code) and the percentage of minorities in
the population of the community.24 Similarly, a study performed by
the General Accounting Office in 1983 found that the majority of
20. See Robert R. Kuehn, Remedying the Unequal Enforcement of Environmental
Laws, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 625, 627-28 (1994); Marianne Lavelle & Marcia
Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
21, 1992, at S2.
21. For example, Alabama law prohibits the siting of more than one commercial haz-
ardous waste treatment or disposal site in any county, see ALA. CODE § 22-30-5.1 (1990),
while New York City's Fair Share Criteria specify that for certain types of environmen-
tally sensitive land uses "undue concentration ... is to be avoided." See New York City
Planning Comnm'n, Criteria for the Location of City Facilities art. 5.1 (Dec. 3, 1990). In
addition, several states have considered or adopted legislation requiring environmental
justice impact statements, which would include a discussion of the demographics of poten-
tial host communities. See Been, Environmental Justice, supra note 10, § 25D.06[3]
(summarizing existing and proposed legislation aimed at environmental inequity). Schol-
ars and activists have advocated shifting attention from legal strategies to grassroots
organizing, as well as requiring enhanced opportunities for participation by affected
communities. See, e.g., Luke Cole, Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, and Grassroots
Activists: Three Models of Environmental Advocacy, 14 VA. ENVTL. L. 3. 687 (1995)
(favoring grassroots activism); Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discrimi-
natory Siting: Risk-Based Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L. J.
329 (1995) (advocating more extensive public participation in siting decisions).
22. See CR3 REPORT, supra note 5, at 23; GAO STUDY, supra note 7.
23. Been, Analyzing Evidence, supra note 19, at 2.
24. CRJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 13-14.
[Vol. 75
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
residents in the communities containing three of the four hazardous
waste landfills in the EPA's Region IV were African-American.
Other studies appeared to confirm these findings.'
However, recent scholarship has raised serious doubts about the
validity of these early studies2 Moreover, the results of recent em-
pirical work indicate that the evidence supporting claims of
disproportionate impact is much weaker than the first wave of re-
search suggested.' This new wave of more methodologically rigorous
statistical analyses demonstrates that demographic data besides race,
such as educational attainment, income level, and political participa-
tion, may be more significant predictors of the placement of
environmentally sensitive land uses than is race.29
In 1994 Professor Been attempted to close the analytic gap cre-
ated by evaluating data from different time periods by re-creating
two of the seminal empirical analyses using demographic data col-
lected at approximately the time of the facility siting.' Her results
provide some support for two distinct theories of the placement of
environmentally sensitive land uses: that they are sited in neighbor-
hoods that are disproportionately minority and that minority
populations in host communities increase after sitings.31 Most impor-
tantly, her inquiry demonstrates that much more empirical work
remains to be done.32
That same year, researchers at the Social and Demographic Re-
25. GAO STUDY, supra note 7, at 1, 4. EPA's Region IV is comprised of Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
The population of all four host census areas was quite small: the average population in
1980 was 752 and the total population was 3007. 1d.
26. See Bullard, Solid Waste Sites, supra note 1, at 285-86; see also Paul Mohai &
Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evidence, in RACE AND THE
INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE, supra note 6, at
166 (collecting and summarizing sixteen studies of the distribution of environmentally
sensitive land uses).
27. See, e.g., Douglas L. Anderton et al., Hazardous Waste Facilities: "Environmental
Equity" Issues in Metropolitan Areas, 18 EVALUATION REV. 123, 126-27 (1994); Vicki
Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses In Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Sit-
ing or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.. 1383, 1384-87 (1994) [hereinafter Been, Locally
Undesirable Land Uses]; Christopher Boerner & Thomas Lambert, Environmental Injus-
tice, 118 PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1995, at 61, 65-68; Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing
"Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw.
U. L. REV. 787,796 (1993).
28. See Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 27, at 1392-97.
29. See Been, Analyzing Evidence, supra note 19, at 5-6.
30. See Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 27, at 1398-1406.
31. See id. at 1404-06.
32. See id. at 1406.
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search Institute (SADRI) at the University of Massachusetts pub-
lished the results of an analysis demonstrating that variations in
methodologies significantly affect the conclusions that can be drawn
from the demographic data concerning host communities.3 The
SADRI study examined the social and demographic characteristics of
communities hosting the same commercial hazardous waste facilities
studied by the CRJ, using census tracts as the measure of community
instead of zip code areas?' The conclusions reached in this analysis
differ dramatically from those of the CRJ studies. In particular, these
authors concluded that "for the 1990 data.., there is no consistent,
statistically significant national pattern of racial or ethnic discrimina-
tion in the location of commercial [hazardous waste facilities]."3 The
authors added that:
there is some statistical evidence... that the reason there
are higher percentages of minorities near facilities in these
regions is because minorities are more likely to be among
those employed in industrial and precision manufacturing
operations in those regions.36
Professor Been subsequently published an evaluation and com-
parison of the SADRI and CRJ studies.37 She first refined the data
used in both the CRJ and the SADRI studies by cross-checking
sources and comparing data bases to real facilities, and then sub-
jected the demographic data to rigorous and extensive statistical
analyses." Ultimately, she concluded that the distribution of envi-
ronmentally sensitive land uses "is not a simplistic PIBBY-'put it in
Black's backyards.' , Rather, it reflects "a much more ambiguous
and complicated entanglement of class, race, educational attainment,
occupational patterns, relationships between the metropolitan areas
and rural or non-metropolitan cities, and possibly market dynam-
ics.,,40
Offering a new perspective on the issue, Professor James Hamil-
ton's research suggests that the decision whether to expand a
commercial hazardous waste facility correlates with the extent of po-
33. See Douglas A. Anderton et al., Environmental Equity: Evaluating TSDF Siting
Over the Past Two Decades, WASTE AGE, July 1994, at 83, 92.
34. See id. at 84, 86.
35. Id. at 90.
36. Id.
37. See Been, Analyzing Evidence, supra note 19, at 2-4.
38. See id. at 8-21.




litical participation in a community (measured primarily by actual
voter turnout figures), but not with the race of the community's resi-
dents.4'
B. The Enforcement of Environmental Protection Statutes
Even if environmentally sensitive land uses were sited in a fair
and unobjectionable manner, poor and minority communities would
have a legitimate basis for complaint if the environmental standards
that apply to such land uses were less strictly enforced in their com-
munities, causing poor and minority citizens to be exposed to an
unacceptable level of environmental risk. This concern also animates
the environmental justice movement.2 Ultimately, however, the em-
pirical support for claims of disparate enforcement practices is as
inconclusive as it is for claims of discriminatory siting.'3
The results of the seminal study on the issue of disparate en-
forcement were published by the National Law Journal (NLJ) in
1992.4 The authors of that study examined virtually all of the civil
enforcement cases resolved by the Environmental Protection Agency
between 1985 and 1991, and concluded that in several enforcement
areas significant disparities were correlated with the race of the host
community. In particular, the NHI study determined that the average
penalties imposed for violations of federal environmental protection
41. See James T. Hamilton, Testing for Environmental Racism: Prejudice, Profits,
Political Power?, 14 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 107, 118 (1995). Unfortunately, Ham-
ilton used zip codes to define communities for his study. See id. at 115. Because zip codes
are drawn for the convenience of the postal service, they are not uniform in size or popu-
lation. See id. at 114 n.3. Thus, it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from a study
that defines communities by reference to zip codes.
While Hamilton's is the first attempt to empirically analyze the role of political par-
ticipation in the siting decision, many scholars have suggested that environmentally
sensitive land uses are placed in poor and minority communities because the residents
lack political power. See Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the
Environmental Justice Movement, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES
FROM THE GRASSROOTS 15, 18 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993) ("Where then will incinera-
tors or other polluting facilities be sited? [According to one industry report], the answer
is low-income, disempowered neighborhoods with a high concentration of nonvoters. The
ideal site, according [to] their report, has nothing to do with environmental soundness but
everything to do with lack of social power.").
Of course, to note that a community is characterized by low voter turnout is not the
same as articulating a theory of disempowerment. See infra text accompanying notes 184-
217 for more discussion of the possibility that the current distribution of environmentally
sensitive land uses is attributable to political disempowerment.
42. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 27, at 818-19.
43. For summaries of the major enforcement studies, see Been, Environmental Jus-
tice, supra note 10, § 25D.02[3]; Kuehn, supra note 20, at 627-38.
44. See Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 20, at S1-S12.
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laws governing air, water, and hazardous waste pollution were 46%
higher in white communities than in minority communities;4s that
penalties imposed under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act for violations at sites located in communities having the largest
percentage of non-minority residents were, on average, 500% higher
than penalties at sites with the greatest percentage of minority resi-
dents;-, that abandoned hazardous waste sites in minority
communities take approximately 20% longer than sites in non-
minority areas to be placed on the National Priorities List (NPL) for
cleanup under the Superfund program;47 and that preferred, perma-
nent, and complete treatment methods were more likely to be
selected at NPL sites in white communities, while the less permanent
(and statutorily disfavored) option of containment was more often
selected at minority sites.4
As with the early empirical studies purporting to demonstrate
race-based disparate impact from siting practices, the NLJ study has
become the target of serious criticism based on methodological
shortcomings. 9 Moreover, several subsequent empirical analyses call
into question the conclusions of the NLJ study." For example,
Shreekant Gupta, George Van Houtven, and Maureen Cropper
studied 110 NPL sites involving contaminated soil to determine
whether EPA cleanup decisions were correlated with the race and/or
income of host communities.51 After controlling for factors that
might influence enforcement decisions (such as whether the site is in
a rural or urban area,52 and the initial level of toxicity at a site), the
authors found that neither the cleanup goal nor the choice of treat-
ment options was correlated with the racial demographics of the host
45. See id. at S2.
46. See id. at S2, S4.
47. See id. at S2, S6.
48. Seeid.
49. See, e.g., THOMAS LAMBERT ET AL., A CRITIQUE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
4-7 (January 1996) (Vol. 8, No. 1) (vhite Paper for the National Legal Ctr. Policy Inst.);
Mary Bryant, Unequal Justice? Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics Revisited, SONREEL NEWS,
Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 3.
50. See, e.g., John A. Hird, Environmental Policy and Equity: The Case of Superfund,
12 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 323, 337 (1993) (finding that the pace of cleanup at NPL
sites was unrelated to the racial and economic demographics of the host county).
51. Shreekant Gupta et al., Do Benefits and Costs Matter in Environmental Regula-
tion? An Analysis of EPA Decisions under Superfund, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND:
ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, & LAw 83, 88 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds.,
1995).




community 3 Even in those studies that identify some race or in-
come-based disparities in enforcement of environmental protection
statutes, the conclusions are much more tempered than those offered
by the NLJ.' Thus, as with the complaint of inequitable siting prac-
tices, the case for disparate enforcement of environmental laws
remains unproven.
C. Policy Initiatives and Proposed Reforms
Legal scholars responded to the early empirical analyses in force.
In 1991, the Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy hosted the first
symposium on environmental justice and its inaugural issue was de-
voted to the publication of papers arising out of that symposium. By
late 1994, the number of law review articles and notes on the topic
exceeded seventy," and as of early 1995 seven law reviews had dedi-
cated an entire symposium to the issue of environmental racism.'
The field had become so saturated that in 1995 Professor Kenneth
Manaster was able to publish an anthology of readings and commen-
taries on environmental justice."
Because so many articles on environmental racism were written
at essentially the same time, there are many similarities among them.
As an initial matter, most legal academics in this field base their as-
53. See id. at 105-06.
54. See CLEAN SITES, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES AND THE RURAL POOR: A
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 48-51 (1990) (concluding that potential Superfund sites in
rural poor communities were placed on the NPL at just half the rate of other potential
sites, but that, once a site in such a community was placed on the NPL its cleanup pro-
gressed as quickly or more quickly than the cleanup at all sites); Rae Zimmerman, Social
Equity and Environmental Risk, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 649, 660-63 (1993) (finding that the
higher the percentage of African-American residents in communities hosting NFL sites,
the less likely these sites would progress to the final pre-cleanup stage, but noting that
progress appeared to be correlated primarily with time on the NPL, which was itself cor-
related with race).
A recent study of solid waste facilities in Virginia is exception to the prevalence of
mixed results. That study revealed that facilities in communities in which more than half
the population was African-American were inspected less frequently than other facilities
and when violations of applicable environmental protection laws were found, the median
length of compliance was longer in these communities. See JOINT LEGIS. AUDIT & REV.
COMM'N, VA. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SOLID WASTE FACILIY MANAGEMENT IN
VIRGINIA: IMPACT ON MINORITY COMMUNITIES 76-80 (1995).
55. Symposium, Environmental Equity in the 1990s: Pollution, Poverty, and Political
Empowerment, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1991).
56. For a review of the environmental racism literature, see Robert W. Collin, Re-
view of the Legal Literature on Environmental Racism, Environmental Equity, and
Environmental Justice, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 121 (1994).
57. See id. at 123 nn.4-7 (describing five published and two forthcoming symposia).
58. 1995 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE (Kenneth A. Manaster ed.).
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sertions of disproportionate impact on the conclusions drawn in early
empirical studies that are now being questioned. 9 Moreover, while
many environmental racism scholars challenge the equity of the ex-
isting distribution based on perceived process failures, none have
advanced a coherent theory of these failures. For the most part, the
literature simply refers to our country's history of disenfranchisement
of minorities' and the continuing effects of discrimination in em-
ployment and housing markets.61
Reform proposals emerging from this first wave of legal scholar-
ship take several forms. Most, however, are premised on the
assumption that these process failures distort the measure of land use
preferences of poor and minority communities. These proposals
generally assume that if residents of minority and poor communities
were not excluded from relevant decision-making processes they
would not choose to host environmentally sensitive land uses, or if
members of these communities did not face mobility constraints re-
suiting from discriminatory housing and employment markets, they
would avoid living in communities hosting such land uses. As a con-
sequence, many reform proposals and initiatives are designed to
enhance opportunities for residents to participate in siting decisions.62
The methods suggested for enhancing participatory options include:
requiring siting authorities to provide more "user-friendly" informa-
tion to potential host communities;6 empowering residents of
potential host communities to take advantage of existing opportuni-
ties to participate in environmental decision-making;' increasing
opportunities for minorities to participate in environmental decision-
59. See supra notes 22-41 and accompanying text (discussing the various empirical
studies).
60. See, e.g., Clarice E. Gaylord & Geraldine W. Twitty, Protecting Endangered
Communities, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771,771 (1994) ("Historically, [people of color and
low-income communities] often lacked the essential resources necessary to oppose sitings
of potentially hazardous facilities: money, organization, and political voice.").
61. See Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 27, at 1388-90 (1994); Ra-
chel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394, 398-99
(1991).
62. See Cole, Empowermen supra note 11, at 661-67; Deeohn Ferris, Communities of
Color and Hazardous Waste Cleanup: Expanding Public Participation in the Federal Su-
perfund Program, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.L 671, 674-77 (1994); Sheila Foster, Race(ial)
Matters: The Quest for EnvironmentalJustice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721,751 (1993).
63. See Cole, Empowerment, supra note 11, at 675-77.
64. See Luke W. Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A View from the Field,




making; and requiring authorities to negotiate a compensation
package with host communities to offset the burdens of the facility.
6
However, because they are premised on the assumption that poor
and minority communities would not rationally choose to host envi-
ronmentally sensitive land uses, most process-based proposals appear
ultimately to be intended to result in increased opposition to pro-
posed sitings in minority communities.' Other proposed reforms by-
pass the procedural remedy, attempting simply to replicate what is
perceived to be the "accurate" measure of the communities' prefer-
ences by prohibiting the siting of additional environmentally sensitive
land uses in poor and minority communities.
The Clinton Administration accepted many of the environ-
mental justice recommendations in early 1994, when President
Clinton signed Executive Order 12,898 regarding "Federal Actions to
Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-
Income Populations."6 The Order requires every federal agency to
make the achievement of environmental justice part of its mission
"by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately
high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its pro-
grams, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-
income populations."7 More specifically, the Order requires agen-
65. See Lazarus, supra note 27, at 850-52.
66. See Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay Attention?, 21
FORDHAM UR. L.J. 787, 788-92 (1994) (suggesting that compensated siting may be a
sound policy option).
67. See Cole, Empowerment, supra note 11 passim (urging legal services attorneys to
empower poor and minority communities to participate in the political decision-making
process concerning environmentally sensitive land uses in order to stop the siting of such
facilities in their communities and force industry to move from pollution control to pollu-
tion prevention); Poster, supra note 62, at 747 ("The grassroots activism that has
dominated community-based efforts to seek environmental justice has been primarily
outcome-focused. Activists seek to change the outcome of decisions made about the dis-
tribution of an environmental hazard through protests and other confrontational
strategies.").
68. There are notable exceptions to the focus on opposition. Professor Dan Tarlock
cogently argues that the environmental equity movement's focus on expanded civil rights
based legal remedies and ardent adoption of the "Not in My Backyard" (NIMBY) ap-
proach to political activism is short-sighted and doomed to failure. See A. Dan Tarlock,
City Versus Countryside: Environmental Equity in Context, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 461,
465 (1994). Professor Tarlock urges environmental equity advocates to embrace a theory
of sustainable development in order to protect environmental quality and still achieve the
economic development that poor and minority communities-in particular, cities-
urgently need.
69. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321
(West 1994).
70. Id. § 1-101.
1996]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cies to conduct programs in a nondiscriminatory fashion," to include
diverse segments of the population in health and environmental re-
search, and to collect extensive data on environmental justice issues.2
Finally, the Order enhances the opportunities for public participation
in environmental decision-making, particularly by minorities and the
poor.' While Congress has considered many bills seeking to promote
environmental justice since 1990, to date no federal legislative re-
forms have been enacted.74
Environmental equity advocates have enjoyed somewhat greater
success at the state and local level.75 A few states and municipalities
have adopted legislative reforms mirroring some of the academic
proposals.76 Alabama law, for example, prohibits the siting of more
than one commercial hazardous waste treatment or disposal site per
county.' The Fair Share Criteria adopted by the New York City
Planning Commission specifies that "undue concentration of facilities
providing similar services or serving a similar population is to be
avoided."78 And in North Carolina, counties and cities approving
sites for solid waste landfills must "consider alternative sites and so-
cioeconomic and demographic data... prior to selecting or
approving a site for a new... landfill... that is located within one
mile of an existing... landfill.,
79
Many more states have considered such reforms. Bills intro-
duced in several states would have required the preparation of
71. See id. § 2-2. This portion of the Order tracks the language of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
72. See 3 C.F.R. § 3-3.
73. The Order requires, among other things, that minorities and low-income citizens
be permitted to become involved in the agencies' development of environmental justice
strategies, and that agencies translate crucial documents involved in environmental deci-
sion-making for limited English speaking populations that might be affected by the
decisions. See 3 C.F.R. § 5-5.
74. For a summary of the environmental equity bills considered in Congress, see
Been, EnvironmentalJustice, supra note 10, § 25D.06[2], 25D-125.
75. Professor Been has collected and evaluated state and federal legislative proposals
and legislation. See Been, Environmental Justice, supra note 10, §25D.06, 25D-121.
76. For a summary of state initiatives and proposals, see Id. § 25D.06[3], 25D-130.
77. See id. § 25D.06[3][a][i] (citing ALA. CODE § 22-30-5.1(c)(1987)).
78. New York City Planning Comm'n, Criteria for the Location of City Facilities art.
5.1 (Dec. 3, 1990).
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-325(a) (1994); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-136(c)
(1991) (requiring board of commissioners to consider alternative sites and to hold public
hearing prior to approving a site for a new sanitary landfill).
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environmental justice impact statements containing demographic in-
formation about proposed host communities.' Other proposed
legislation sought to facilitate participation of economically disadvan-
taged communities in siting decisions.8 Such refora initiatives are
likely to continue to be introduced in state legislatures."
In light of the weaknesses shared by the early empirical studies,
and the more tempered conclusions of the more recent analyses, it
seems prudent to reconsider the issue of environmental racism in
general, and the advisability of proposed and adopted reforms in par-
ticular. That more recent empirical evidence indicating that class
influences (such as job status and income level) are more significant
in the distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses than are
racial factors should not be surprising. The market allocates accord-
ing to ability to pay: the more money one has, the more of any
particular good-including a clean environment-one can afford to
purchase. Moreover, people tend to live near their jobs, those that
depend on public transportation even more so than others. Thus,
people employed in environmentally sensitive industries will be more
likely to live in or near a community that hosts such industries. Fi-
nally, the political process responds to people who have the time,
money, education, and inclination to participate. The more one has
of any or all of these, the more likely one is to have an effective voice
in policy-making or enforcement decisions. Accordingly, we should
ask ourselves the very difficult question whether the current distribu-
tion of environmentally sensitive land uses represents simply the
revealed preferences of a society characterized by substantial and
growing disparities in income and opportunities. As part of this new
focus, we must be mindful that, in our society, class and race continue
to interact in many disturbing ways.Y Thus, while the cries of envi-
80. See, e.g., A.B. 2212, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993); H.R. 2349 § 1, 1993-94 Reg.
Sess. (Minn. 1994).
81. S.B. 5742,215th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1993).
82. See Been, Environmental Justice, supra note 10, § 25D-130 ("More than a dozen
states either have passed legislation relating to the distribution of noxious facilities or
have such legislation pending. More are likely to consider such legislation soon, because
members of the National Black Caucus of State Legislators are seeking to introduce envi-
ronmental justice legislation in all fifty states during the 1995-96 legislative sessions.").
83. According to Census Bureau figures, the portion of all persons in the United
States living below the poverty level hovered around 14% of the population between 1970
and 1992. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTIcAL ABSTRACr OF THE U.S.:
1994, at 475 (1994). During that time, approximately 33% of African Americans and
26% of Hispanics lived below the poverty level, while only 11% of the white population
did. See id. The median income for white families in 1992 was $38,909; for African-
American families it was $21,161; and for Hispanic families it was $23,901. See id. at 471.
1996]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ronmental "racism" may be exaggerated, the plaint of inequity may
not be. It may just be misdirected.
III. PRIVATE PREFERENCES, COLLECTIVE JUDGMENTS, AND
CHOICE
Our society relies on markets and the political process to allo-
cate and distribute a vast array of society's goods and services,
including many that are essential to health, welfare, and prosperity,
and many that are risky or hazardous. In general, the market meas-
ures individual (or private) preferences through the very rough proxy
of market choices and translates those preferences (choices) into al-
locative and distributive decisions." The political process responds to
the community's preferences, or, if you will, its collective judgments.
Measures designed to interfere with the preferences revealed through
these institutions generally demand substantial justification.
A. Markets, Politics, and Preferences
Most of society's scarce resources are allocated through some
price-based mechanism, the vast majority of them in the marketplace.
Traditional market-based allocation mechanisms are not reserved for
those goods and services that are non-essential or luxuries. Food,
housing, and access to medical care, perhaps three of the most fun-
damental components of health and welfare, are allocated and
distributed primarily through market mechanisms.
A pure market mechanism for translating private preferences
into allocative and distributive decisions functions deceptively sim-
ply. According to neoclassical economic theory, people are endowed
with a relatively stable set of preferences concerning fundamental
aspects of life, such as health, prestige, education, and personal satis-
faction, as well as the capacity and inclination to act rationally in an
effort to maximize their welfare with respect to these preferences."
Individuals and other economic actors, such as firms and families,
then pursue this welfare-maximizing goal using such inputs as market
84. Allocative choices refer to determinations of how much of a particular good or
service society will produce. The phrase distributive choices, on the other hand, refers to
determinations of who has access to the goods and services produced. These are the two
types of societal choices that Professors Calabresi and Bobbitt refer to as first order and
second order decisions, respectively, in their influential book Tragic Choices. See GUIDO
CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBFIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 19(1978).
85. See Gary Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, in RATIONAL
CHOICE 108, 110 (Jon Elster ed., 1986).
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goods and services, time, and their own labor.' Markets coordinate
the various actions of these economic entities: Prices and other mar-
ket structures allocate the scarce resources in society to produce a
certain combination of goods and services. Then the market distrib-
utes these goods and services consistent with the welfare-maximizing
goals of the actors."
Allocative and distributive decisions typically occur in the con-
text of conventional market transactions: "[O]ne person sells a
commodity to another who is willing to pay for it."'" However, price-
based allocative and distributive choices "are not restricted to mate-
rial goods and wants, nor even to the market sector."' 9  The
nonmarket sector employs "shadow" prices, in the form of foregone
opportunities, to replicate the allocative and distributive functions of
traditional markets. As Professor Lane explains:
Every good that is chosen has an opportunity cost measured
by the values of the goods not chosen.... Thus, the pricing
of goods in the market and the exchange orientation in-
volved in market transactions are merely extensions of
nonmarket acts, extensions to situations where the pricing
and the exchanging are made more conscious.'
Because its quantity is fixed, time is among the scarcest re-
sources held by most people. Accordingly, many shadow prices are
measured in terms of the time that each endeavor makes unavailable
for other pursuits. For example, when a parent chooses to miss the
evening news in order to read to her child, the parent expresses a de-
termination that she values the time with her daughter more than
time spent watching the news.9' Similarly, a citizen who chooses to
spend time with his children rather than attend a rally protesting the
siting of an environmentally sensitive land use expresses his prefer-
ence for the former activity over the latter.
Of course, the fact that most goods and services are allocated
through the market does not indicate that this institution is ideal or
without fault. Indeed, many challenge the use of the words "choice"
86. See iL
87. See id.
88. Cass R. Sunstein, Disrupting Voluntary Transactions, in MARKETS & JUSTICE:
NOMOS XXX1 279,279 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989). Of course,
"[t]he conventional market transaction takes many forms.... [T]he commodity may be a
job, a part of the body, an artistic work, or an opportunity to advertise on television." Id.
89. Becker, supra note 85, at 111.
90. Robert E. Lane, Market Choice and Human Choice, in MARKETS & JUSTICE:
NOMOS XXXI, supra note 88, at 226,240-241.
91. See id.
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and "preference" to describe the motivations underlying market
transactions entered into by segments of society that face significant
constraints on their range of market options."
The challenges take two related forms. First, "choices" in the
pure market context are measured by willingness to pay for a good or
service, and willingness to pay is a function of ability to pay. Thus,
market choices are defined and confined by the existing distribution
of wealth.' In a society such as ours, marked by dramatic inequalities
in wealth, it would be naive to consider these constrained market
choices as autonomous or exogenous to those wealth constraints."
Second, the measure of willingness to pay is dependent on the initial
allocation of legal entitlement.95 In determining the market value of a
clean environment, for example, we could ask residents of a potential
host community how much they would pay to avoid the siting of an
environmentally sensitive land use (which assumes that the developer
is entitled to site the facility in the community and must be paid to
refrain), or we could ask the developer how much she would pay to
induce the citizens to permit the siting (which inversely assumes that
the citizens have a right to be free from residential proximity to such
92. Robert Hale's early piece on the coercive aspects of private bargaining provides
one of the first systemic challenges to the vision that laissez faire economics is a system
premised on and promoting economic liberty. See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress,
and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603 passim (1943). Hale's insight has not lost
its currency. See, e.g., THOMAS 0. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT
RISK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH AD-
MINISTRATION 271-72 (1993) (challenging the assumption that low-paid workers in
hazardous industries make "free and unconstrained risk decisions" and suggesting that
they "may be acting more out of desperation than of choice"); Cass R. Sunstein, Prefer-
ences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 19-24 (arguing that poverty is perhaps the
most severe obstacle to the development of preferences and beliefs) [hereinafter Sun-
stein, Preferences and Politics].
93. Of course, preferences (and, hence, choices) are influenced by much more than
just the initial allocation of wealth. "[P]references are shifting and endogenous rather
than exogenous, and as a result are a function of current information, consumption pat-
terns, legal rules, and general social pressures." Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, supra
note 92, at 10. See generally JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION
OF RATIONALITY 143-48 (1983) (arguing that social classes make different kinds of errors
about social causality because they occupy different positions in the economic structure).
94. As Professors Calabresi and Bobbitt explained: "The willingness of a poor man,
confronting a tragic situation, to choose money instead of the tragically scarce resources
always represents an unquiet indictment of society's distribution of wealth." CALABRESI
& BOBBITT, supra note 84, at 33. Market choices are also influenced by a host of social
clues and constructs. For more on the problem of endogenous preferences, see infra text
accompanying notes 261-65.
95. These two points are related because most legal entitlements, ultimately, can be
reduced to a form of wealth.
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a facility and must be paid to accept the siting).96
Largely as a result of these damning criticisms of our reliance on
the market to measure preferences concerning the allocation and dis-
tribution of important resources, our society has adopted substantial
constraints on the harsh consequences of the market system. Gov-
ernmental policies regarding taxes, subsidies, transfer payments,
regulations, and prohibitions either directly or indirectly affect the
allocation and distribution of many market goods. These policies are
adopted through the political process, primarily on the basis of ma-
jority rule (or by representatives elected by a majority of the voters),
and the minority is generally bound by the preferences of the major-
ity or its representativesY
The machinations of the political process are not as simple, even
in theory, as the operation of the market. Indeed, two competing
conceptions of the political process have reemerged within the past
decade. Public choice theory views the political process much like
the market, and assumes that "government is merely a mechanism
for combining private preferences into a social decision."" As with
market theory, the heart of the economic model of political activity is
the assumption that participants are motivated by self-interest." In a
representative democracy the principal policymaker is the legislator.
Accordingly, public choice theory posits that the self-interest of leg-
islators will ultimately determine legislative choices. Assuming that
legislators are primarily interested in re-election, they will advance
policies that further that end, although public choice theorists have
different views on how legislators accomplish this. Some public
choice scholars contend that legislators attempt to maximize their
appeal to their constituents, who vote according to their own self-
interest. Others recognize the power of interest groups-and lobby-
ing, financial support, and publicity-in the political process. These
96. See MCGARrrY & SHAPIRO, supra note 92, at 273-75; Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth
A Value?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 237,237-54 (1985).
97. This is obviously a simplification. Many decisions made in the political arena are
delegated to administrative agencies, or implemented by executive order. In addition,
there are notable exceptions to the general use of majority rule. Nonetheless, it is proba-
bly accurate to say that most decisions affecting the siting of environmentally sensitive
land uses are made by officials who are responsible, directly or indirectly, to a majority of
the voters.
98. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 44 (1991).
99. See id. at 22; Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-
Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J
145, 148 (1977-78) (describing the public choice model, in which "[tihe legislature is con-
ceived as a market-like arena").
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public choice theorists view politics as dominated by a few small
groups seeking to benefit themselves at the expense of others." °
Civic republicanism, on the other hand, eschews the individualis-
tic assumptions of the public choice model. Instead, republicans view
legislatures as forums for public deliberation and civic virtue. Under
this conception:
[P]olitical life is more than the use of government to further
the ends of private life, as it is in liberalism. Rather, politics
is a distinct and in some respects superior sphere. By par-
ticipating in public life, citizens rise above their merely
private concerns to join in a common enterprise. They put
aside their own interests and enter a public-spirited dialogue
about the common good. Once found, the public interest
disciplines their private pursuits.0'
Drawing conclusions about which model of the political process
most accurately describes our current political environment is beyond
the scope of this paper. For my purpose, however, it is important to
note that under either conception of collective decision-making (that
is, whether participants are seeking to advance their purely private
self-interest or some view of the public good), the role of the political
process is, ultimately, to translate private preferences into social
choices."" Accordingly, the impact on the formation of preferences
caused by inequitable distributions of wealth and other entitlements
will be evidenced in the political arena as well as in the market-
place,"3 and the judgments reached there may be no less suspect than
those expressed by market choices. Moreover, the difficulty in meas-
100. Professor Cass Sunstein argues that our Constitution embodies a norm that re-
jects the understanding that the purpose of politics is to aggregate or to trade off private
interests. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1689, 1694-97 (1984). He admits, however, that if such a norm exists it is substan-
tially under-enforced. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences,
53 U. Cm. L. REV. 1129, 1134 (1986) [hereinafter Sunstein, Legal Interference].
101. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 98, at 44.
102. Of course, the private preference may be a "second order preference" to adopt a
policy designed to affect, alter, or reject, existing preferences.
103. As with market choices, preferences expressed through the political system may
be influenced by a host of factors in addition to the distribution of wealth, such as existing
legal rules and perceptions and misperceptions about available options. As Professor
Sunstein argues in his recent work on the First Amendment:
What people now prefer and believe may be a product of insufficient informa-
tion, limited opportunities, legal constraints, or unjust background conditions.
People may think as they do simply because they have not been provided with
sufficient information and opportunities.
CASS R. SuNSTEiN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 19 (1993)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter SUNsTEIN, DEMOCRACY].
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uring public preferences and translating those preferences into social
policy should temper our enthusiasm for turning to social policy to
correct market flaws.
Notwithstanding these acknowledged limitations of our mecha-
nisms for measuring private preferences, American society, for the
most part, treats such preferences as the basis for social choice."°
This is true in large part because we are committed to the belief that
individuals know what is in their best interest and can reflect that
knowledge through market and political choice. Liberty-based objec-
tions to social interference with private preferences contend that
autonomy is best served by self-sovereignty, and that the government
ought not to be in the business of evaluating whether a person's
choices best serve her interests. Utilitarians and law and economics
scholars argue that revealed preferences provide the best measure of
individual welfare (or utility), and that maximizing individual welfare
(or utility) is the best way to maximize social welfare. In that con-
text, it is argued that interfering with private preferences directly
undermines the efficient allocation of resources. Other scholars em-
phasize the persistence of private preferences, and contend that, in
general, legal interference with such preferences will be futile be-
cause the preferences will manifest themselves in other waysY5
While circumstances exist, of course, in which the liberty, effi-
ciency, and/or futility arguments give way to other goals, such
circumstances are rare and demand substantial justification."s In a
very limited set of circumstances, society has determined that par-
ticular decisions should be removed from the political process or the
market system altogether.' More commonly, we may consign the
allocation and distribution of particular resources to these spheres,
while at the same time adjusting those processes, or the preferences
104. Cf. Sunstein, Legal Interference, supra note 100, at 1131-32 (discussing the auton-
omy and futility objections to interfering with private preferences).
105. See id. at 1132.
106. See id. at 1131-32.
107. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1891 &
n.153 (1987). It is difficult to remove allocative decisions from both the market and po-
litical spheres. Ultimately, society must make a choice about how much of any resource it
wishes to produce, and few alternative mechanisms can accomplish this. While it is possi-
ble that some important distributive determinations will be made by alternative
mechanisms (such as merit, queuing, lottery, or failure consciously to decide), these
mechanisms themselves have shortcomings and rarely can satisfactorily replace the more
accepted institutions of the market and political system. See CALABRESI & BOBBrrr,
supra note 84, at 41-50 (discussing the distribution of scarce resources by lottery or the
customary approach); see also JON ELSTER, LOCAL JUSTICE 67-134 (1992) (discussing the
various principles under which scarce resources and necessary burdens are distributed).
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expressed through them, when demonstrated process failures under-
mine our confidence in the accuracy of the preferences they reveal.
Additionally, society may reject even accurately measured private
preferences. This generally occurs when society concludes that cer-
tain preferences are illegitimate or unacceptably harmful to self or
others. More recently, however, it has been suggested that society
should feel increasingly free to interfere with accurately measured
private preferences in circumstances where those preferences do not
represent truly autonomous choices."' The task facing the environ-
mental justice movement is to demonstrate that decisions resulting in
the current distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses impli-
cate one or more of the generally accepted justifications for rejecting
choices expressed in the market or political arena.
B. Private Preferences, Collective Judgments, and Environmentally
Sensitive Land Uses
Before we undertake that task, however, it seems that we should
at least explore the possibility that these processes have functioned
well, and that the distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses
reflects the accurately measured, unobjectionable preferences of host
and non-host communities.
1. Risk, Rewards, and Rational Preferences in the Siting of
Environmentally Sensitive Land Uses
It is not difficult to construct a theoretical framework in which
the choice to live in a community that hosts an environmentally sensi-
tive land use is neither irrational nor otherwise objectionable. To do
so, we must distinguish between: (1) the type and significance of the
risks associated with different categories of environmentally sensitive
land uses; (2) the type and significance of the benefits associated with
these land uses; and (3) the groups of people among which the risks
and benefits will be distributed.
Because the risks of challenged land uses are the focal point of
environmental racism literature, I will begin there. The EPA catego-
rizes the risks posed by environmental issues it regulates into four
domains: human cancer risks, human non-cancer health risks, wel-
108. See, e.g., Sunstein, Legal Interference, supra note 100, at 1145-58. See generally
Robin L. West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REV. 659 (1990) (arguing for
paternalistic judicial interference with private preferences based on a sympathetic under-
standing of private actors' true best interests).
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fare risks, and ecological risks.o° Humans face these same categories
of risks in almost all of their activities, and making decisions con-
cerning risky activities is something we all do in daily life. For
example, smoking cigarettes presents a measurable risk of decreased
life expectancy, and many of us choose not to smoke as a conse-
quence of those health risks. Our risk-related decisions are often
made without conscious deliberation. For instance, each automobile
trip to the supermarket also presents a risk of injury or death, but
most of us choose to run off to the store without giving much thought
to that risk.
Individuals making lifestyle choices and government officials es-
tablishing policy undertake essentially the same analysis in evaluating
risk. In our private lives, determining the seriousness of a risk in-
volves an identification of the risky behavior or substance, an
estimate of the probability that exposure to the substance or behavior
will lead to harm, an estimate of our frequency or probability of ex-
posure to the substance or behavior, and an assessment of the
seriousness of the harm that will result if exposure in fact leads to
harm. Official risk assessment mimics these inquiries. Under federal
guidelines, risk can be expressed as a function of the probability of
exposure to the harmful agent(s) associated with -the facility, the
probability of suffering an adverse impact if exposed, and the type
and likely severity of the possible adverse impact, should it occur.'
Whether evaluated by a policy-making body or by individual
residents of a proposed host community, the risk posed by a particu-
lar environmentally sensitive land use necessarily will fall along a
109. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COM-
PARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS, OVERVIEW REPORT (1987)
[hereinafter UNFINISHED BusIEss]. For many environmentally sensitive land uses, the
possible adverse impacts are not related to human health. The phrase "environmental
impact" can encompass a broad range of effects on the human environment, such as aes-
thetic, cultural, historical, and socio-economic impacts, in addition to pure health impacts.
This use of the phrase is consistent with most federal environmental statutes, such as the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), as well as with the broad range of uses
challenged as locally undesirable by the literature and social activist groups. See NEPA,
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1994) (evidencing a broad conception of the term "environment");
40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (1995) (interpreting the phrase "environmental impacts" in NEPA
to include "ecological (such as the effects on natural resources and on the components,
structures, and functioning of affected ecosystems), aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic,
social, or health [impacts], whether direct, indirect, or cumulative").
110. See, e.g., Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (1986);
Guidelines for Estimating Exposures, 51 Fed. Reg. 34,042 (1986); OFFICE OF
EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, RISK
ASSESSMENT GUIDANCE FOR SUPERFUND: VOLUME I HUMAN HEALTH EVALUATION
MANUAL (PART A) INTERIM FINAL (EPA/540/1-89/002) (1989).
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continuum: At one end will be those environmentally sensitive land
uses that have a low probability of a relatively minor adverse effect,"'
at the other end will be those facilities that have a high probability of
a catastrophic outcome. In between will be the entire range of facili-
ties that have a measurable risk of some level of harm.
In contrast to the possible harms associated with residential
proximity to environmentally sensitive land uses, many such uses of-
fer benefits to residents of the host community." Such benefits may
include increased job opportunities, increased property tax revenues,
sharing of user fees, infusion of money into the local economy
through increased demand for services, the building and maintenance
of infrastructure, and even the environmental benefits of shifting
from older to newer technology for industrial production or waste
disposal. Therefore, challenged land uses should be divided between
those that provide some benefit to the host community and those that
provide little or no such benefit.
By distinguishing among types of environmentally sensitive land
uses according to risk of harm and benefits offered, a useful inquiry
into the impact of challenged land uses would arrange all possible
uses along a four-squared matrix: Those that pose little health risk
and offer some or significant benefits, those that pose little health
risk and offer little or no benefits, those that are potentially hazard-
ous but offer some or significant benefits and those that are
potentially hazardous and offer little or no benefits. A rational indi-
111. The probability of the adverse impact occurring is determined by multiplying the
probability of exposure by the probability of harm if exposed, as long as the probabilities
are independent. In most cases involving environmentally sensitive land uses, it seems
unlikely that these two probabilities would be correlated.
112. Interestingly, the demonstrated adverse health effects attributable to proximity to
hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities rank very low in comparison to
other health risks, most of which-like smoking, poor diet, and lack of exercise-are at
least in part attributable to voluntary lifestyle choices. See STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECnVE RISK REGULATION 6-7 (1993)
(noting that pollution and industrial products may account for less than 3% of all cancer
deaths in a year while cigarette smoking may be responsible for as many as 30%).
113. Most environmentally sensitive land uses confer benefits and burdens on a
broader group of people than those living in the host communities. For instance, consum-
ers benefit from the industrial production that generates hazardous wastes, and residents
of a utility's service area build industries and entire communities using the electricity
generated by coal-fired or nuclear power plants. On the other hand, many of the burdens
of environmentally sensitive land uses are exported from the host community. For exam-
ple, coal-fired power plants emit toxins that fall on other areas as acid rain, hazardous
waste incinerators spew ashes which may themselves be hazardous waste, and groundwa-
ter migration from a landfill may contaminate a river that flows through many
communities. See Peter Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of a Regula-
tory Authority, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1002, 1032-35 (1987).
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vidual's preference for the placement of an environmentally sensitive
land use would certainly be influenced by where the proposed use
falls in this matrix. Similarly, a well-functioning community consid-
ering whether to host an environmentally sensitive land use must
evaluate the potential risks and benefits of the proposed facility ac-
cording to the criteria outlined above. As Professor Bradford Mank
suggests, "[e]nvironmental justice proponents are undoubtedly
genuinely concerned about the risk of [environmentally sensitive land
uses] ... but local residents may be making the right choice in ac-
cepting relatively minor risks in exchange for concrete benefits.""4
Assigning any given environmentally sensitive land use to a par-
ticular position in our matrix will be neither easy nor uncontroversial.
As an initial matter, formal risk assessment theory is not without its
critics. Risk assessment is controversial in part because it attempts to
calculate expected losses in the face of substantial uncertainties:
To critics mindful of the risk-uncertainty distinction, even
calling the enterprise "risk" assessment seems to be
stretching the point; to them, it is one thing to calculate the
expected value of a $5 bet on red in roulette, but it is a far
more contingent, uncertainty-ridden exercise to calculate
the expected number of leukemia cases due to airborne
traces of benzene or the environmental effects of an oil
spill.
15
In addition, even if one accepts the importance of risk assess-
ment as a positive tool of policy making, much has been made
recently of the deficiencies of comparative risk analysis as a norma-
tive undertaking. Professor Donald Hornstein persuasively argues
that the EPA's attempt to elevate comparative risk analysis to a sci-
ence and to establish it as the only rational determinant of
environmental decision-making has seriously distorted the difficult
normative dimensions of contemporary environmental disputes by
undervaluing moral components of risk assessment."6
However, society ultimately must adopt some mechanism for
comparing risks and making choices. To the extent that the science
of risk assessment is imprecise and involves controversial normative
114. Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting: Risk-Based
Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L.. 329,401 (1995).
115. Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 572 (1992) (explaining the theoreti-
cal limitations of comparative risk analysis as a tool for establishing environmental
protection policy.)
116. See id. at 584-633.
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judgments, it can be argued that we should leave such choices to indi-
viduals as much as is possible. Certainly, individuals make risk
comparisons on a daily basis. Indeed, the principal criticisms of com-
parative risk analysis involve its failure to accommodate the observed
peculiarities of human responses to perceived risks. Accordingly,
whatever criticisms are being leveled at current risk comparison
techniques should not undermine our confidence in the accuracy of
private preferences-revealed by individual market decisions-to
trade the perceived risks of an environmentally sensitive land use for
the perceived benefits.
At the same time, all communities must, and regularly do, make
land-use decisions that involve trade-offs between risks and potential
benefits, and to say that the task is difficult does not make it go away.
Indeed, the primary purpose of the political process is to make collec-
tive normative judgments. If a community's process for comparing
risks and benefits fails to capture all of the considerations believed to
be relevant to its residents, a cogent argument can be made for a
more inclusive process. 8 That argument, however, does not con-
demn the comparative risk enterprise, nor does it suggest that the
results of past risk assessments are systematically biased against any
particular group.
2. Rational Preferences Revisited: Winners, Losers, and Race
Citizens of affluent states and communities regularly exchange
tax concessions and other benefits to serve as the location of new fa-
cilities for major enterprises, expecting to recoup their concessions
through increased employment and tax revenues. For example, Aus-
117. See id at 592-615; see also Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the
Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46-64 (1995) (discussing common critiques of cost-
benefit analysis and exploring the divergence between expert and lay assessments of risk).
118. Drawing on extensive social science research in the area of risk and psychology,
Professors Pildes and Sunstein identify the following "salient contextual features" that lay
people incorporate into their evaluations of risk:
(1) the catastrophic nature of the risk; (2) whether the risk is uncontrollable; (3)
whether the risk involves irretrievable or permanent losses; (4) the social condi-
tions under which a particular risk is generated and managed, a point that
connects to issues of consent, voluntariness and democratic control; (5) how eq-
uitably distributed the danger is or how concentrated on identifiable, innocent,
or traditionally disadvantaged victims, which ties to both notions of community
and moral ideals; (6) how well understood the risk process in question is, a point
that bears on the psychological disturbance produced by different risks; (7)
whether the risk would be faced by future generations; and (8) how familiar the
risk is.
Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 117, at 57.
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tin and other central Texas communities routinely offer tax incen-
tives to high-tech industrial enterprises to entice them to locate
production facilities in central Texas instead of Silicon Valley. In
1993, Round Rock, Texas attracted a major Dell Computer expan-
sion by offering lucrative tax abatements, while Austin won a
national competition for Samsung Electronics in 1996 by offering tax
abatements under a new city policy."9 Samsung will build a $1.3 bil-
lion memory chip plant in northeast Austin."' While the community
members may debate among themselves whether such concessions
are worth the benefits, outsiders rarely question whether the com-
munity ought to be permitted to make the exchange. 2'
For predominantly poor and/or minority communities, there
may be no excess revenue to accommodate offers of tax breaks, or
any other carrots to dangle before the desired industry. These com-
munities can trade only what they have, and many have offered the
willingness to accept risk. To be persuasive in their claims of ineq-
uity, environmental racism scholars must demonstrate why we should
permit (and perhaps even encourage) the former exchange and pro-
hibit the latter.
As noted above, risk assessment is an inexact enterprise, and
much disagreement will surround official and individual evaluations
of the benefits and burdens of any environmentally sensitive land use.
In addition, even the most aspirational portrayals of civic decision-
making do not claim universal satisfaction with the outcomes of the
process. Indeed, virtually all political decisions result in winners and
losers, or at least perceptions of winning and losing. In the case of
environmentally sensitive land uses, the losers will be those that disa-
gree with the decisionmaker's determination that the benefits of a
119. See Dylan Rivera & Kirk Ladendorf, Williamson Cities Want Chip on Their
Shoulder, AUSTIN AMERICAN STATESMAN, Aug. 13,1996, at Al.
120. See id.
121. Of course, society's willingness to accept such competition is not without logical
limits. Such bargains may implicate a form of the collective action problem referred to as
the prisoners' dilemma, in which the strategic pursuit of individual self-interest by each
actor results in an outcome that is suboptimal for both. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 906-07 (1987). Par-
ticularly in the context of environmental protection, federal regulation is understood to
play an important role in ensuring that such collective action problems do not result in
suboptimally lax pollution control standards. See e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of
Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Envi-
ronmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977). For an interesting challenge to this
conventional wisdom, see Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Re-
thinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom": Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
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proposed use outweigh the burdens. This disagreement may stem
from a divergent perception of the risk posed by the proposed land
use, such that the dissenting members of the community believe that
the facility falls in a different box of the benefit/burden matrix, (i.e.,
where the burden outweighs the benefit)."i On the other hand, the
disagreement may reflect a rejection of the matrix altogether if the
dissenting members of the community are unwilling to weigh the par-
ticular type of risk posed by the challenged use against the kind of
benefits (usually pecuniary) offered in return."
Moreover, risks and benefits are not distributed evenly among
residents of host communities. As discussed above, some members
of host communities may enjoy a net benefit from residential prox-
imity to the environmentally sensitive land uses. However, in any
community that hosts an environmentally sensitive land use, some
residents will bear burdens that outweigh their individual benefits.
Advocates for environmental equity would have us believe that
the winners and losers from the current distribution of environmen-
tally sensitive land uses divide along race lines. This assertion is
based simply on the composition of the host communities: If host
communities are disproportionately made up of minorities, then mi-
norities must be disproportionately burdened. Perhaps
environmental equity advocates intend to claim that, within pre-
dominantly minority or poor communities, the poor and/or minority
residents in general rationally would prefer not to exchange the risk
associated with a challenged use for the potential benefits because
they systematically disagree with the majority's assessment of the
risks and benefits. Or, environmental equity advocates may be
claiming that the minority and poor residents within host communi-
ties generally bear more of the risk and receive less of the benefit of
challenged land uses.
To support this contention, environmental equity advocates
must demonstrate that minority members of host communities are
less likely to be among the group of residents benefited by the envi-
ronmentally sensitive land uses and more likely to be among those
made worse off. This proof would require them to disaggregate af-
fected residents into relevant categories and assess the impact of the
benefits and burdens of the challenged land uses within each cate-
122. For a summary of research regarding the manner in which lay risk assessments
may differ systematically from expert risk assessments, see Pildes & Sunstein, supra note
117, at 55-64.
123. See BULLARD, DuMPING N DIXIE, supra note 3, at 91 (rejecting compensatory
siting schemes as an unacceptable form of job blackmail).
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gory. For example, if introducing the challenged land use into the
community causes a decrease in property values in the community,
current homeowners will be adversely affected, while prospective
homeowners will be made better off.' The effect on rental property
will depend on the structure of the rental market in the community.
If the siting of the challenged land use brings an influx of prospective
tenants, rents are likely to increase and landlords will benefit at the
expense of current and future tenants. On the other hand, if the de-
crease in property values causes current tenants to become
homeowners and demand for rental residents does not increase as a
result of the siting, then landlords may face decreasing rents.
Job status prior to the siting will also be relevant to an evalua-
tion of the benefits and burdens brought by environmentally sensitive
land uses. While the introduction of jobs into a community is good
for the community in general,m a resident who already has a good job
is likely to benefit less, and less directly, than one who gains needed
employment with the new facility. One's status as a taxpayer and
consumer of public services will also determine the extent to which
the introduction of the challenged use is beneficial. If the challenged
land use contributes to the tax base, taxpayers may benefit from de-
creased rates, and/or users of public services may benefit from
increased or enhanced services. Conversely, some communities pro-
vide tax concessions to lure challenged uses, in which case taxpayers
will be subsidizing benefits to others. Finally, one's health status in
general, or degree of susceptibility to the environmental hazard pre-
sented by the challenged use in particular, will be relevant to a
124. Studies indicate that proximity to inactive hazardous waste sites has a negative
effect on house values. See, e.g., Katherine A. Kiel, Measuring the Impact of the Discov-
ery and Cleaning of Identified Hazardous Waste Sites on House Values, 71 LAND ECON.
428, 428-29 (1995). If property values fall as a result of the placement of an environmen-
tally sensitive land use, poor homeowners are likely to be hardest hit, since their homes
often are their primary asset. In addition, there may well be home-related losses that are
not monetizable. For example, neighborhood character and cohesion may be destroyed
by the introduction of an environmentally sensitive land use and the resulting flight of
those who can afford to leave. The negative impact on home values, however, is likely to
be a consequence of the inactive status of the waste site, since an inactive site is unlikely
to offer any community benefits. Further study is needed to determine whether active
environmentally sensitive land uses typically reduce the values of houses nearby.
125. New jobs add income to the community, stimulating business and adding to tax
revenues. In addition, the introduction of a significant number of new jobs may impose
upward pressure on local wage rates. See Christopher Boerner & Thomas Lambert, Envi-
ronmental Injustice, 118 PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1995, at 61, 74-75 (discussing the
NAACP's support for the construction of an incinerator and solid waste landfill in
Brooksville, Mississippi, in part because the facility was expected to alter the area's low
wage scale).
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determination of whether one is benefited or burdened by the siting.
The very young, the very old, and the infirm may bear a greater por-
tion of the burden of the siting than the healthy residents of the host
community.
To be sure, race and, more likely, income may be statistically
correlated with the broader version of several of these categories,
such as employment status, homeownership status, occupation, and
even susceptibility to environmental risks.' However, this correla-
tion does not easily translate onto the grid of affected citizens in a
host community. For example, if the decision to site an environmen-
tally sensitive land use in a community decreases property values,
current homeowners are hurt and prospective home buyers are made
better off. It is not self-evident which category is more likely to be
disproportionately poor or minority (or more disproportionately
poor or minority than other members of the host community). Simi-
larly, if rents decline after the siting, then the rental population will
benefit at the expense of landlords. Accordingly, in order to draw
conclusions about the distribution of the burdens of environmentally
sensitive land use, we must carefully assess the multifarious impacts
and benefits of the facility and compare this assessment to the par-
ticularized demographic characteristics of the host community.
3. Rational Preferences and Environmentally Sensitive Land Uses in
Context
Several examples of siting determinations, past and present, as
well as post-siting community transformations offer support for the
theory that communities and individuals might rationally determine
that residential proximity to environmentally sensitive land uses is in
their best interests.
a. Siting Decisions in the Past: Sumter County, Alabama
A facility often held up as the leading example of discriminatory
siting or environmental racism is Chemical Waste Management Cor-
poration's Emelle hazardous waste treatment, storage, and land
disposal facility in Sumter County, Alabama. African-Americans
account for 69% of the residents of Sumter County, and for 90% of
126. For a discussion of the possibility that vulnerable population groups sensitive to
the health effects of exposure to environmental pollution are disproportionately com-
prised of minorities, see Samara R. Swanston, Race, Gender, Age, and Disproportionate
Impact: What Can We Do About the Failure to Protect the Most Vulnerable?, 21
FonDHiAm URB. L.i. 577,588-601 (1994).
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the residents who live in poverty.' Environmental racism scholars
allege that the facility was "foisted on the Emelle community without
their input"'m because "[n]o blacks held public office or sat on gov-
erning bodies, including the state legislature, county commission, or
industrial development board (an agency that promotes industrial
operation in the county) from predominantly black Sumter
County."' ' Moreover, these scholars question the safety of the facil-
ity, citing a history of EPA and state enforcement actions which
resulted in fines and suspension of shipments of wastes to the state.
m
However, the story of Sumter County and Chemical Waste
Management is much more complex.'' Formerly a rich farming and
cotton-producing region (its heritage from the plantation system of
slavery), for decades before the Emelle plant was built in 1978, Sum-
ter County struggled against the decline of its agricultural economic
base. "[Flarmers were forced off their land, and others chose to sell
their land for non-farm uses."' Between 1940 and 1980, the popula-
tion of Sumter County declined more than 40%." Its remaining
residents faced an extremely high incidence of poverty, alarming
rates of illiteracy, and infant mortality rates that were among the
highest in the state."4 With no hope that the agricultural economy
could be revitalized, the opportunity to host an industry that would
bring jobs and tax revenues may well have looked attractive to Sum-
ter County residents.
While environmental racism scholars would have us believe oth-
erwise, it is unlikely that Sumter County was chosen as the location
for the Emelle plant because its residents were poor and black. Prior
to Chemical Waste Management's decision to purchase the Emelle
127. See BULLARD, DUMPING INDIXIE, supra note 3, at 69.
128. Robert B. Wiygul et al., Environmental Justice in Rural Communities, 96 W. VA.
L. REv. 405,411 n.16 (1993-94).
129. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 3, at 70.
130. See id. at 72-73; see also Conner Bailey & Charles E. Faupel, Environmentalism
and Civil Rights in Sumter County, Alabama, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF EN-
VIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, A TIME FOR DISCOURSE, supra note 6, at 128, 140-46
(describing in detail the demographics and economy of Sumter County).
131. Professor Bradford Mank offers some of this detail in his recent article proposing
risk-based representation and equitable compensation as solutions to the environmental
racism debate. See Mank, supra note 114, at 398-400.
132. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 3, at 69.
133. See id.
134. See Environmental Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 76-77 (1993) [hereinafter
House Hearings] (statement of Charles J. McDermott, Director of Government Affairs,
Waste Management, Inc.)
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site, the Environmental Protection Agency had identified it as one of
the ten most protective sites in the nation for disposal of hazardous
waste. 5 The site's suitability was based on such factors as rural loca-
tion and access to appropriate transportation systems. 6  More
important, the geologic conditions of Sumter county make it ideally
suitable to the land disposal of hazardous wastes. "[Sumter County
is] located atop the 'Selma chalk formation,' several hundred square
miles of dense, natural chalk 700 feet deep. The EPA concluded that
this chalk formation provided an ideal barrier between any disposal
activities and the nearest aquifer feeding a drinking water source
.... " Finally, the low precipitation rates in that region of Alabama
would further decrease the possible risk of groundwater contamina-
tion.m
Moreover, it is not at all clear that the presence of the Emelle fa-
cility has been burdensome to its host community. While it may be
true, as Professor Bullard claims, that "[t]he Emelle hazardous-waste
site has not brought about an economic renaissance to this poor
blackbelt community,"' 9 the benefits are tangible. The facility em-
ploys over 400 people, 60% of whom live in Sumter County, and has
an annual payroll of $10 million."° State law provides that a portion
of the hazardous waste excise tax collected at the Emelle facility be
committed to Sumter County, with a minimum annual guarantee of
135. See id.
136. "Sumter County is rural but not isolated, served by Interstate 59, an active rail-
road, and the recently opened Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway." Bailey & Faupel, supra
note 130, at 142.
137. House Hearings, supra note 134, at 76-77 (statement of Charles J. McDermott,
Director of Government Affairs, Waste Management, Inc.).
138. See id.
139. BULLARD, DUMPING INDIXIE, supra note 3, at 71.
140. See Bailey & Faupel, supra note 130, at 143 (citing the number of employees);
House Hearings, supra note 134, at 77 (statement of Charles J. McDermott, Director of
Government Affairs, Waste Management, Inc.) (citing population and payroll studies). It
is not clear how many of these employees lived in Sumter County before the landfill was
opened, and how many moved to the community to accept jobs. To the extent the em-
ployees arrived after the siting, their migration supports the theory that some people will
choose to live near certain environmentally sensitive land uses to take advantage of bene-
fits generated by the proximity of these facilities, such as jobs, increased tax revenues, and
better public services. In addition, the introduction of four hundred jobs into a local
economy stimulates that economy to the benefit of the community as a whole, not just
those members who are employed by the new industry. Bailey and Faupel estimate that
Chemical Waste Management's operations had an annual impact of $25.4 million on Sum-
ter County's economy between 1985 and 1989. Even Professor Bullard concedes that
CWM is the largest employer in Sumter County. See BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE,
supra note 3, at 71; see also Bailey & Faupel, supra note 130, at 143 (outlining the eco-
nomic impact of CWM on Sumter County).
[Vol. 75
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
$4.2 million. 4' Since the landfill was opened in 1977, this increased
tax revenue has been used to build infrastructure, enhance educa-
tional opportunities for the children of the county, and improve the
deliverance of health care services. 2 These services have reversed
the percentages of illiteracy and infant mortality.'43
In contrast to the measurable benefits discussed above, the con-
cerns about increased health risks resulting from the facility are
largely conjectural. Professor Bullard points out that Chemical
Waste Management was fined by the Alabama Department of Envi-
ronmental Management in 1983 for failing to complete a lining
system, and by state and federal officials in 1984 "for poor manage-
ment procedures, PCB problems, and [an] inadequate ground-water
monitoring system at the site."' 44 In addition, in 1985 the EPA tem-
porarily suspended shipment of Superfund wastes to the site after
tests revealed possible groundwater contamination. However, "[tihe
ban later was lifted after further tests were made."' 45 While all citi-
zens should be concerned with any failure to comply with
environmental protection standards and regulations, these particular
instances of noncompliance by Chemical Waste Management's
Emelle facility do not indicate that residents of Sumter County were
being exposed to hazardous wastes. The fines cited by Bullard ap-
pear to involve inadequate procedures; none resulted from evidence
of environmental contamination. Without more information, it ap-
pears that the waste receipt suspension was based on test results that
could not be replicated, or that were proven false. Even if we assume
that some leakage was associated with these instances of noncompli-
ance, the only evidence suggesting that the hazardous waste reached
the groundwater deposits 700 feet below the Selma chalk formation
appears to have been vulnerable to the results of further tests. Recall
that the EPA identified the Sumter County area as one of the ten
counties most suited to the land disposal of hazardous wastes. It is
precisely because accidents happen that hazardous waste treatment,
141. McDermott, House Hearings, supra note 134, at 77 (statement of Charles J.
McDermott, Director of Government Affairs, Waste Management, Inc.).
142. See id.; BULLARD, DUMPINGINDIxIE, supra note 3, at 71.
143. See House Hearings, supra note 134, at 77 (statement of Charles J. McDermott,
Director of Government Affairs, Waste Management, Inc.). The benefits brought by the
landfill are not only pecuniary. CWM purchased 3200 acres upon which the landfill is
located. See Bailey & Faupel, supra note 130, at 143. Of these, only 300 are actually de-
voted to landfill operations. The remainder serves as a buffer zone and is managed as a
wildlife preserve. See id. at 143 n.2.
144. BULLARD, DUMPING INDIXIE, supra note 3, at 72.
145. Id.
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storage, and disposal facilities should be located in the safest possible
areas.
The economic transformation of Sumter County, from a declin-
ing agricultural community to a more stable industrial one, indicates
that land uses which may be considered undesirable by some com-
munities may in fact provide benefits to the host communities which
outweigh their burdens. These benefits may be particularly attractive
to those without jobs, social services, or adequate educational oppor-
tunities for their children.
b. Contemporary Siting Decisions: The Mescalero Apaches
One could argue that the siting of the Chemical Waste Manage-
ment plant in Emelle, Alabama can be explained in large part by the
exclusion of Sumter County residents from the decision-making
process that led to the placement of the facility. If so, the validity of
the preferences measured by that political action would be suspect.
In recent years, however, several environmentally sensitive land uses
have been expressly invited or actively solicited by residents of poor
and/or minority communities. The Mescalero Apaches of southern
New Mexico are one such community.
In 1995, that community voted to permit storage of high-level
radioactive wastes in their community in anticipation of a lucrative
payoff in jobs, tax revenues, and exaction fees. High-level radioac-
tive wastes contain the raw materials necessary for the manufacture
of nuclear weapons. Nearly all of these wastes are generated by two
enterprises-the production of electricity by nuclear power plants
and the manufacture of nuclear weapons-and both of these activi-
ties are declining in frequency and intensity.' No new nuclear power
plant has been ordered since 1979, the year of the accident at Three
Mile Island." In addition, since the end of the Cold War, domestic
manufacture of nuclear weapons has virtually stopped.1" Nonethe-
less, nuclear power plants generate approximately 1,900 tons of spent
fuel each year, for which no interim storage facility designed for long-
term disposal exists. 4 As a result, th~s highly radioactive material is
stored in temporary on-site facilities at the reactor where it was
146. See MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND




149. See id. at 30.
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used.m Having abandoned the prospects of reprocessing the fuel in
the 1970s, the United States now faces a high-level radioactive waste
disposal crisis."
Since 1982, the Department of Energy has been attempting to
locate a suitable site for permanent deep geologic disposal of the
country's high-level radioactive waste.' Although Yucca Mountain,
Nevada was identified as the future site of the disposal facility, the
State of Nevada "then began a long campaign of litigation, raising
many serious technical questions about the site and considerably de-
laying the project."'5 3 Accordingly, no permanent storage facility is
expected to be available for disposal of high-level radioactive waste
until 2010 at the earliest, and perhaps not until 2020 ."
Until the permanent facility opens, operators of the nation's nu-
clear power plants are seeking a more stable facility for the
temporary storage of their spent fuel rods. The United States ini-
tially planned to fund and build a Monitored Retrievable Storage
(MRS) facility to store spent fuel temporarily and prepare it for
placement in the permanent disposal facility.'5 However, in the face
of mounting controversy about any such facility, Congress withheld
the money for federal involvement in the program in 1993. Since
then, private utilities have sought volunteer communities to host a
MRS facility funded and operated by the utilities.'56
On March 10, 1995, the Mescalero Apaches voted to permit their
tribal leaders to enter into an agreement with approximately thirty
utility companies to provide storage for the companies' high-level
radioactive waste until the Yucca Mountain permanent disposal fa-
150. As of 1991, 9546 cubic meters of spent fuel was stored on-site at commercial reac-
tors. See id. at 29-30.
151. The liquid residue from the manufacture of plutonium for warheads is now stored
in 177 underground tanks at the Hanford Reservation in southern Washington state.
"Several of the tanks are leaking, and sixteen times between 1987 and 1991 they released
toxic gases." Id. at 27-28. ,
152. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 required the Department of Energy
(DOE) to recommend to the president three potential sites for future study. See 42
U.S.C. § 10132(b)(1)(B) (1994). The DOE recommended Yucca Mountain, Nevada;
Deaf Smith County, Texas; and Hanford, Washington. Before the study could be com-
pleted, however, Congress directed the Department to locate the permanent storage
facility at Yucca Mountain. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C.
§ 10172(a) (1994).
153. See GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, supra note 146, at 30.
154. See iL
155. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,42 U.S.C. §§ 10161-69 (1982).
156. See GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, supra note 146, at 31.
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cility is opened.' The vote came one month after the tribe rejected
its leaders' proposal to engage in such negotiations, and followed in-
tense lobbying concerning the risks and benefits of the placement of a
temporary storage facility on tribal lands." Opponents (including
New Mexico state leaders) fear radioactive contamination, and won-
der what will happen to the site if the United States fails to open a
permanent disposal facility." Tribal leaders claim that
"environmentalists and other outsiders had earlier misled the people
into forgoing high-tech jobs and millions of dollars for schools and
social services.""' The Mescalero tribe expects to receive $250 mil-
lion in direct and indirect benefits to store the waste until the federal
facility is completed.'61
c. A Community Transformed: Richmond, California
Richmond, California, has a population of approximately 80,000
and lies just northeast of San Francisco. Richmond and its vicinity
host a variety of industrial, petrochemical, and chemical manufac-
turing facilities. These facilities generate, transport, and store vast
quantities of hazardous materials, and emit or discharge substantial
amounts of pollutants regulated by the EPA and the California Air
Quality Control Board.1' While Richmond is a racially diverse com-
munity, a majority of its residents are members of minority groups.
According to 1980 census information, approximately 48% of Rich-
mond residents were African-American and 40% were white."6
Hispanics, who were not separately counted in the 1980 census, com-
prised approximately 10% of the population of Richmond. 64 Thus,
according to the criteria used by most environmental racism scholars,
Richmond provides another example of disproportionate impact
from the siting of environmentally sensitive land uses.
157. See George Johnson, Nuclear Waste Dump Gets Tribe's Approval in Re-vote, N.Y.
TIMES, March 11, 1995, at 6.
158. See id.
159. See id. Some opponents also allege that tribal leaders may have been bribed to
engage in coercive efforts to change the results of the vote. See id. These allegations, if




162. See CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT, RICHMOND AT RISK: COMMUNITY
DEMOGRAPHICS AND TOXIC HAZARDS FROM INDUSTRIAL POLLUTERS 45-84 (1989)
[hereinafter RICHMOND AT RISK].




Richmond, however, was not a pristine minority community in-
vaded by noxious industrial land uses. On the contrary, industry
grew in Richmond and lured its residents with the promise of jobs.
Indeed, one of the earliest industrial plants to locate in Richmond
was Vulcan Powder Works, which located there in 1878 because it
was suitably unpopulated.'" Other explosives companies followed
suit, moving to Richmond to produce dynamite and nitroglycerin for
the Bay Area's numerous construction projects."
The decision by the Santa Fe Railroad to make Richmond the
terminal point for its transcontinental line in 1900, combined with
Richmond's large deep-water port, attracted many other major
manufacturing facilities to the area in the early part of the century.'67
Standard Oil opened the second largest refinery in the world in
Richmond in 1902, and Western Pipe and Steel Company arrived
soon thereafter." Richmond's industrial base continued to grow
during the first half of the twentieth century.
It wasn't until World War II, however, that the population of
Richmond boomed. During the war, Kaiser Shipyard became one of
the largest wartime production facilities, producing ships at the rate
of one per day and employing 100,000 workers at the peak of its war
effort.6 9 "The migration of workers to the Kaiser Shipyards caused
Richmond's population to explode from a pre-war total of 23,642 to
more than 100,000. Much of the city's current racial composition can
be traced to this boom period when many southern Blacks left their
farms seeking wartime employment."'"7
While Richmond's industrial base continues to grow, as existing
companies expand operations and others arrive to take advantage of
its large labor pool and transportation facilities, the fact that most of
its residents are minorities appears to be directly attributable to indi-
vidual choices to seek employment in a highly industrialized area.
Nonetheless, some environmental equity advocates rely on communi-
ties like Richmond to provide evidence of the injustice of the existing
distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses.'





170. Id. at 22.
171. See Charles Lee, Developing the Vision of Environmental Justice: A Paradigm for
Achieving Healthy and Sustainable Communities, 14 VA. ENVT'L L.J. 571, 575 (1995); see
also Jane Kay, California's Endangered Communities of Color, in UNEQUAL PRO-
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IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTERFERING WITH PRIVATE
PREFERENCES: REVIEWING THE THEORIES AND EVIDENCE
As noted above, private preferences generally serve as the basis
for social choice, and these preferences are usually measured by mar-
ket choices or political actions. In some circumstances, however,
society makes a collective judgment to remove certain allocative or
distributive determinations from the market or political process alto-
gether, or interferes with choices that are perceived to result from
systemic process failure.
A. Interfering with Private Preferences to Adjust for Errors
Of the circumstances in which a liberal society will interfere with
private preferences, its determination to correct for process failures is
perhaps the least controversial. Environmental justice advocates
may argue that the market and political processes used to distribute
environmentally sensitive land uses and the housing nearby are so
flawed that the preferences they measure lose any credible claim to
accuracy or legitimacy. In such an instance, the argument would con-
tinue, society must either correct the process failures or adjust its
response to the measured preferences.
1. Imperfect Markets and Discrimination As a Market Failure
To command unlimited confidence in the welfare-maximizing
nature of private exchanges, the market must operate competitively,
without transactions costs, and market actors must engage in rational
decision-making based on full information concerning available
goods and services. However, when defects in the free operation of
the market distort or limit the choices from which individuals seek to
maximize welfare, we cannot be certain that their choices in fact do
further that goal. Because perfectly competitive conditions rarely
exist, collective judgments are necessary to remedy endemic process
failures such as the exercise of monopoly or oligopoly power, the in-
ability of markets efficiently to distribute public goods and services,
the unavoidable existence of transaction costs, strategic bargaining
and collective action problems, and so forth. At the same time, the
political process is subject to process failures itself. Accordingly, en-
vironmental equity scholars might justify proposals to alter the
existing distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses or amend
the processes by which they are distributed by demonstrating signifi-
TECrION: ENVIRONMENTAL JuSTicE AND CO UNITIES OF COLOR, supra note 2, at
155,165-68 (using Richmond as an example of disproportionate exposure).
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cant and exceptional process failures in one or both of these arenas.
Markets may misallocate resources and fail to distribute com-
modities to best suit private preferences for many reasons. Perhaps
the most common causes of market failure are imperfect competition
and distortions arising from government policies. Few if any markets
are both free of government intervention and perfectly competitive
in the manner that pure neoclassical economics posits as a prerequi-
site for the efficient allocation and distribution of resources. In most
contexts, however, market defects are considered de minimis and
thought not to distort unduly the preferences measured by the sys-
tem.
Housing markets suffer from both defects in the extreme. The
market for residential property is intrusively regulated in a patch-
work pattern reflecting the divergent influences of federal, state,
local, and private restrictions on private market transactions."' For
example, the federal income tax system favors home ownership over
rental, thereby distorting the relative prices of and allocation of re-
sources between the two uses. 3 Zoning measures such as density
restrictions, large-lot and minimum floor area requirements, and
limitations on multi-family dwellings restrict residential mobility and
permit wealthy communities to externalize costs of development and
prosperity. 4 Finally, privately enforced deed restrictions, planned
communities, and cooperative living arrangements further undermine
our confidence in the allocative efficiency of housing market transac-
tions.
In addition, the market for residential housing is plagued by
forces undermining the fluid trend toward general equilibrium that
characterizes perfectly competitive markets. Perfectly competitive
markets rely on the existence of many producers offering customers
perfect (or at least close to perfect) substitutes for goods and serv-
ices.' Mr. Filburn's wheat, for example, was indistinguishable from
wheat grown and sold on the market. 6 Accordingly, his private con-
172. For an overview of the types of imperfections that generally affect housing mar-
kets, see Molly McUsic, Note, Reassessing Rent Contro" Its Economic Impact in a
Gentrifying Housing Market, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1835,1849-50 (1988).
173. See id. at 1849.
174. See id. at 1850; see also Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Politi-
cal Geography in LegalAnalysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1870-71 (1994) (discussing the
consequences and legal treatment of exclusionary zoning policies); Developments in the
Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427,1626-27 (1978).
175. See KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICs 62-63 (2d
ed. 1992) (describing necessary characteristics of a perfectly competitive market).
176. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 133 (1942).
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sumption of his home-grown wheat decreased market demand for
wheat by the amount consumed." In such a market, producers are
price takers, and no single supplier has control over price or competi-
tion. 78 More than perhaps any other commodity, housing stock
(including the amenities associated with living in particular neighbor-
hoods and communities) is heterogeneous, and close substitutes are
difficult to find. In the housing market, then, suppliers may capture
monopoly profits, or be plagued by monopsony rent-seeking.
Moreover, perfectly competitive markets attain allocative efficiency
only if consumers have full information about the goods and services
available on the market.179 Housing markets are characterized by in-
complete or misleading information concerning fundamental yield,
and, accordingly, our confidence in the allocative efficiency of private
housing transactions is undermined."'
These general market defects can be found in all housing mar-
kets to some degree. Moreover, the distortions affect buyers
differentially by income class, not by race. Thus, poorer home buyers
have fewer choices from among the available stock, and their inabil-
ity to pay prevents them from purchasing a vast amount of that stock.
The common wisdom, then, that the poor live near environmentally
sensitive land uses because that property is less expensive is perfectly
consistent with this understanding of the housing market. It would,
however, be perfectly consistent with a perfectly competitive market
as well. The difference is a matter of degree, not of kind.
On the other hand, little reason exists to believe that the general
absence of competitive market conditions distorts the distribution of
housing choices such that members of minority groups are more
likely to live near environmentally sensitive land uses. If any charac-
teristic of the market for residential property could distort the
distribution of residential proximity to environmental land uses to-
ward minorities, it would be race-based discrimination.
Environmental racism scholars emphasize the role that discrimi-
nation in the housing market plays in distorting the translation of
preferences into market choices. For example, Professor Bullard as-
serts that:
[i]nstitutional barriers such as housing discrimination, red-
177. See icL at 128 ("[I]t supplies a need of the man who grew it which would otherwise
be reflected by purchases in the open market. Home-grown wheat in this sense competes
with wheat in commerce.").
178. CAsE & FAIR, supra note 175, at 62.
179. See id. at 351.
180. See McUsic, supra note 172, at 1850.
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lining by banks, and residential segregation prevent African
Americans from buying their way out of health-threatening
physical environments. The ability of an individual to es-
cape a health-threatening physical environment usually
correlates with income. However, racial barriers complicate
this process for millions of African Americans. An African
American who has an income of $50,000 is as residentially
segregated as an African American on welfare."8'
Indeed, ample evidence exists to support allegations of contin-
ued racial discrimination in the housing market. In particular,
discrimination in the residential leasing market, and redlining (the
practice of restricting the availability of mortgage money in minority
communities) are well documented as contemporary phenomena. s2
It seems indisputable that minorities seeking housing have access to a
smaller portion of the available stock than do their non-minority
counterparts and, therefore, face impediments to mobility not en-
countered by whites."s
The evidence of decreased residential mobility, however, does
not lead inexorably to any particular conclusion about the desirability
of the existing distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses. In
particular, to the extent that individual minorities may prefer to mi-
grate to communities hosting environmentally sensitive land uses to
take advantage of the jobs or other benefits offered by a challenged
facility, decreased mobility attributable to discrimination in the
housing market may decrease the correlation between minority
population and the location of such land uses.
The ultimate effect of racial discrimination in the housing mar-
ket is merely to exacerbate the class issues discussed above. To the
extent that minorities are limited in their choice of residential prop-
181. Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism, in ToxIc STRUGGLES:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 27, 30 (R. Hofrichter ed.,
1993).
182. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 96-109 (1993)
(discussing discriminatory practices currently employed in the real estate and home fi-
nancing industries).
183. However, the evidence of discrimination is not one-sided. While the preference
to self-segregate is not as widely held among minorities as it is among whites, minorities
nonetheless demonstrate a distinct preference to live in communities with a substantial
minority presence. A 1976 study of the Detroit area revealed that 62% of African-
Americans surveyed indicated that their first choice of residential neighborhoods would
be one in which 50% of the residents were African-American. The same study found that
only 17% of African-Americans would desire to live in a neighborhood in which whites
were a majority. See id. at 88-96.
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erty by discriminatory factors, they must expend more resources to
purchase the same level of housing amenities (including distance
from environmentally sensitive land uses) than do their non-minority
counterparts. It seems clear that in the housing sector, as in many
others, minorities face more limited opportunities than do their non-
minority peers. This abhorrent state of affairs cannot be remedied by
limiting those opportunities that remain. If residential proximity to
environmentally sensitive land uses offers opportunities foreclosed
by illegal and invidious discrimination in other spheres, the appropri-
ate remedy would be to continue the crusade against the
discrimination, not to aggravate the already lamentable circum-
stances of the group whose interests are being trumpeted.
2. Politics and Process Failures
While we rely on the political process to allocate and distribute
many resources, environmental racism/justice scholars argue that de-
fects in this process may cause it to fail to measure accurately the
preferences of communities of color. As with the market failure ar-
gument, the accusations aimed at the political process take many
forms. Environmental racism scholars rely principally on the most
simple process failure claim-that people of color are grossly under-
represented in the political process." In the civic republican model,
underrepresentation could impede the full and diverse public discus-
sion necessary to reveal the public. good. Under a public choice
model, underrepresentation exacerbates rent-seeking behavior by
groups that are, by implication, overrepresented.
In addition to the simple claim of underrepresentation, other,
more nuanced challenges to the accuracy of the preferences meas-
ured by the political process might also support the environmental
racism claims. For example, public choice theorists argue that, even
if each member of the community is appropriately represented at the
184. See Cole, supra note 64, at 1995 (noting that "communities of color have been
historically excluded and ... are grossly underrepresented today"); Robert W. Collin,
Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning Approach to Environmental Racism, 11 VA.
ENVrL. L.J. 495, 517 (1992) (arguing that people of color lack the political power to over-
come environmental discrimination); Kelly Michelle Colquette & Elizabeth A. Henry
Robertson, Environmental Racism: The Causes, Consequences, and Commendations, 5
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 153, 169 (1991) ("This exclusion from the siting process may explain
why poor minority communities are so frequently the target of hazardous waste siting and
currently host a disproportionate share of these facilitieg."); Rachel D. Godsil, Note,
Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394, 399 (1991) (stating that com-




decision-making level, well organized interest groups will dominate





In support of their underrepresentation theory, environmental
justice advocates point to the historical exclusion of African-
Americans from the political process, and argue that the effects of
this exclusion continue to undermine our confidence in the accuracy
of determinations made by government institutions."s For example,
Professors Colquette and Robertson assert that "[m]embers of a
community with the least structural power tend to be missing as play-
ers in the hazardous waste siting process,"1" and quote Dr. Bullard's
contention that "'regulatory politics... generally exclude the
poor."'"" Professor Reich explains that "people of color... also lack
access to key planning decisions.., because of language problems,
lack of technical or financial resources, and absence from lobbying
organizations.""1 9  Although environmental justice advocate Luke
Cole's article focuses on the perceived bias against low-income com-
munities in the siting of environmentally sensitive land uses, his
extensive list of explanatory factors encompasses racial as well as in-
come-related considerations:
Many interrelated factors contribute to [the disproportion-
ate exposure of poor and minority communities to
environmental hazards], including industry's tendency to
seek inexpensive land in low income neighborhoods as well
as poor people's lack of political and economic power in re-
sisting such intrusions. The factors that have diminished
certain communities' ability to resist undesirable land uses
and pollution include the racist exclusion of people of color
from decision-making processes and decision-making bod-
ies, racist and economic exclusion from "nicer"
neighborhoods, "expulsive zoning," the exploitation of
workers' immigration status, governmental neglect and de-
185. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 98, at 14-15.
186. See Cole, supra note 64, at 1994-95 (noting that the government often finds "no
relevant population affected" even though underrepresented minority communities were
clearly "affected").
187. Colquette & Robertson, supra note 184, at 168-69.
188. Id at 169.
189. Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimi-
nation, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 271,277 (1992).
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sign, and the "success" of environmental laws.'O
Professor Richard Lazarus has taken a more detailed look at the per-
ceived lack of representation of minorities in the environmental
decision-making processes and contends that minorities are under-
represented in both "those parts of the federal government that
dominate environmental protection policymaking" and at the local
enforcement level of federal environmental bureaucracies.191
Although the standard underrepresentation claims advanced by
environmental justice advocates are seldom supported by empirical
or even anecdotal evidence, they nonetheless have intuitive appeal.
There are several reasons, however, why the protestations of exclu-
sion and disenfranchisement do not present a convincing account of
the causes of environmental racism.
First, only Lazarus is careful to speak of underrepresentation,
not of exclusion. Minorities have not legally been excluded from po-
sitions of decision-making authority for more than two decades."a
Until the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,"3 significant and
substantial structural obstacles prevented blacks from exercising the
franchise.94 In the thirty years since its passage, however, the Voting
Rights Act has succeeded in dismantling most of the pre-existing
"open barriers to black voter registration and the casting of bal-
lots."'95 As a result, black voter registration in the southern states is
dramatically higher than it was before the passage of the Voting
190. Cole, supra note 11, at 619,628-29.
191. See Lazarus, supra note 27, at 819-22.
192. Many of the existing environmentally sensitive land uses were sited before this
country made advances in including .minorities in the political process. See, e.g.,
GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, supra note 146, at 541 ("Of the twenty-one commercial
[hazardous waste] land fills operating today, only one is on a site selected
since ... 1976"). Accordingly, the underrepresentation claim may be more persuasive
with respect to those facilities. However, if underrepresentation is no longer an issue, or
is less of an issue today, the fact that existing facilities were sited under an illegitimate
system does not unequivocally indicate that proposed sitings in the same communities are
suspect.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
194. See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism" The Voting Rights Act and Black
Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1093 n.75 (1991); Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized
Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1833,1838 (1992).
195. Issacharoff, supra note 194, at 1838-39. The expansive exercise of the franchise
by blacks was seen as important not only to the individuals themselves, but also to the
advancement of a progressive social agenda in general. See Guinier, supra note 194, at
1081-82 (describing the evolution through which "[b]lack voter registration and political
participation gradually became the [civil rights] movement's dominant vehicle for imple-




In addition, the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act cre-
ated a group-based right to meaningful participation in the political
process that is intended to protect racial and ethnic minorities from
precisely the kind of "underrepresentation" identified by the envi-
ronmental racism literature.' Under the redrawn statute, "second-
generation" challenges have forced governmental bodies to recon-
struct political institutions that had imposed structural limitations on
the ability of blacks to satisfy electoral expectations even though they
were registering and voting in increasing numbers."8 For example,
"second-generation" litigants successfully challenged the use of at-
large elections, which, combined with bloc voting among an identifi-
able group, serve effectively to dilute the minority vote.' Indeed,
many of the predominantly minority jurisdictions in which environ-
mentally sensitive land uses have been sited may be part of majority
black districts created to enhance the opportunity for blacks to
achieve electoral success at the state level.an In this context, scholars
196. As a result of the Freedom Rides and the use of Federal Registrars, the number
of registered black voters in the South tripled soon after the passage of the Voting Rights
Act. See Issacharoff, supra note 194, at 1838 n.25 (citing Bobby M. Rubarts, Comment,
The Crown Jewel of American Liberty: The Right to Vote; What Does it Mean Under the
Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 1015,1020 (1985)).
197. Of course, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution also prohibit race-based restrictions on the right to vote. The Voting Rights Act,
however, protects that right more extensively than does the Constitution alone. In 1982,
Congress amended the Act in response to the Supreme Court's adoption of an intent-
based test for constitutional voting rights claims in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980), and Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). See Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988)). The 1982
amendments recast the statutory voting rights doctrine to allow a broad-gauged inquiry
into the "results" that challenged practices have on the capacity of minorities to partici-
pate fully in the political process. See Issacharoff, supra note 194, at 1834, 1841 n.38,
1845-46.
198. See Guinier, supra note 194, at 1093-94. A "third-generation" of voting rights ju-
risprudence appears to be upon us. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). In Shaw, the
Court expressed its emerging view of the constitutional limitations on a states' authority
to take race into account in redistricting. See id.; see also Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894
(1996) (invalidating the district lines that were drawn on remand from Shaw v. Reno).
199. See Guinier, supra note 194, at 1093-94; Issacharoff, supra note 194, at 1839-42.
200. Even if environmental justice advocates cannot substantiate an underrepresenta-
tion claim, they may reject majority-take-all decision-making at the state level if it leads
to the siting of an environmentally sensitive land use in a community where the propor-
tion of minorities in the population is larger than that of the state.
This argument may be premised on two concerns: (1) continued discrimination
against, and marginalization of, minority representatives in predominantly white decision-
making bodies; and (2) dissatisfaction with the inability of majority rule decision-making
to satisfy the policy preferences of minority groups. See Guinier, supra note 194, at 1134.
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expressing concern about preferences revealed through the represen-
tative process must do more than simply invoke the once compelling
complaint of underrepresentaton of minorities.2'
Second, the environmental justice advocates' simple cry of mi-
nority underrepresentation fails to confront the more difficult
theoretical issue raised by some voting rights scholars-whether mi-
nority representatives necessarily better protect the interests of
minority citizens than do non-minority representatives.' Professor
Lani Guinier details the difficulties with the once conventional wis-
dom that minority representatives will be more responsive to the will
of their minority constituents,m and suggests that a form of propor-
tionate interest group representation, rather than mere black
electoral success, may better serve the political needs of marginalized
minority groups.' Because the environmentally sensitive land uses
challenged by environmental racism scholars are often sited in poor
communities with large minority populations, land use policy inter-
ests, rather than race, may present the more compelling basis for
political cohesiveness in these communities.
Third, minorities have made greater strides in obtaining elective
offices at the state and local level,"5 and government decisions about
the placement of environmentally sensitive land uses are, for the
most part, made at these levels. Indeed, many of the communities
that host environmentally sensitive land uses are majority-minority
communities. Unless there exists a state or federal override of local
autonomy, or a failure in the democratic processes of the community,
the environmental racism theory is weak when the decision-making
body is elected from a community whose majority are members of
minority groups.
201. Ironically, the underrepresentation criticism becomes even more cogent when the
environmentally sensitive land use is sited in a community where minorities are not a
disproportionately large portion of the population; in these communities, the influence of
the minority voice is likely to be even more limited.
202. See Guinier, supra note 194, at 1128-34.
203. See iL
204. Professor Guinier argues:
For those at the bottom [of the political system], a system that gives everyone an
equal chance of having their political preferences physically represented is in-
adequate. A fair system of political representation would provide mechanisms
to ensure that disadvantaged and stigmatized minority groups also have a fair
chance to have their policy preferences satisfied.
L at 1135-36.
205. See FRANK P, PARKER, BLACK VOTES CoUNT 1 (1990) (pointing out that between
1965 and 1989, the number of African-American elected officials in the United States in-
creased from approximately 500 to 7200).
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Finally, many of the processes leading to the placement of envi-
ronmentally sensitive land uses incorporate opportunities for direct
public participation. The National Environmental Policy .Act
(NEPA) was adopted precisely to provide for public participation in
the early stages of major federal projects having a significant impact
on the environment. 6 NEPA, as applied by federal regulations, re-
quires federal agencies to prepare environmental impact statements
for all federal projects having a significant impact on the human envi-
ronment,2 to circulate that statement to other agencies and
interested private parties,,.. to provide a forum for public comment
on the proposed project,2 and to respond in the final document to
any material criticisms of the project.2 Furthermore, NEPA imple-
menting regulations mandate that environmental impact statements
be written so that "the public can readily understand them, 21' and
require decisionmakers to consider the impacts of the cumulation of
environmentally sensitive projects in any one area.212 Moreover,
other federal statutes require agencies to solicit public participation
at various stages in the regulatory process, and to respond to public
comments in a meaningful manner.2 3
The various states have adopted many different regulatory
frameworks for the siting of environmentally sensitive land uses, and
many of them emphasize the need for public participation in the de-
cision-making process.214 The most striking examples of state-created
means of direct participation are the "mini-NEPAs" that exist in
various states. Currently, state versions of NEPA are operative in at
least thirteen states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.215
206. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1994). While NEPA applies only to federal projects,
that threshold requirement has been interpreted liberally to cover any action that the
federal government has the power to control, either through direct participation, funding,
or agency authorization through a permitting process. Moreover, the public involvement
extends to indirect effects of major federal actions, even if those indirect effects consist of
purely private development.
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
208. See 40 C.F.R. § 1512.19 (1995).
209. See id. § 1503.1.
210. See id. § 1503.4.
211. Id. § 1502.8.
212. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
213. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (1994)(portion of Clean Air Act requiring notice
and a public hearing before state implementation plans can be adopted).
214. See GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, supra note 146, at 52.
215. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21178.1 (West 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 22a-la to -lh (West 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 343-1 to -8 (1985 & Supp. 1992);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-12-4-1 to 13-12-4-10 (Michie 1996); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. Ras. I
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While NEPA applies only to major federal actions, many state
NEPAs apply to state and local projects and to purely private actions.
Moreover, five of the states that do not have mini-NEPAs require
environmental analysis and an opportunity for public participation
for certain types of projects. All of these environmental reviews are
submitted to the public for notice and comment.
In reality, public participation at the state and local level has not
been a significant problem for many years. Most public or private
promoters of environmentally sensitive land uses face one of two
scenarios: (1) either their proposed project is perceived to be lucra-
tive and is subject to bidding among municipalities for the privilege
to host the project, or (2) their proposed project is controversial and
the promoter despairs of ever establishing a site due to ubiquitous
and well-organized public opposition. Thus, states face the contem-
porary challenges of trying to stifle bidding wars that erupt over the
more attractive environmentally sensitive projects (many of which-
such as prisons-were considered locally undesirable in the recent
past) or restricting local absolutists from blocking regionally impor-
tant environmentally sensitive land uses."6
Ultimately, members of the host community may express their
preferences concerning residential proximity to environmentally sen-
sitive land uses with their feet. As discussed above, at least some
host communities attain their predominately minority status after the
challenged use is located within the community. The migrants who
account for this transformation cannot be said to have been left out
of the decision-making process. In fact, by moving into the commu-
nity, they revealed their assessment that the benefits of residential
proximity to the environmentally sensitive land use outweigh the
§§ 1-301 to 305 (1989 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 30, §§ 61-62H (West
1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116D.01-.11 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE. ANN.
§§ 75-1-201 to -207 (1995); N.Y. ENVrL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney
1984 & Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-1 to -13 (1994 & Supp. 1996); S.D.
CODIFIED LAVS §§ 34A-9-1 to -13 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 43.21C.010-43.21C.914 (West 1983 & Supp. 1996); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 1.11 (West 1986
& Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-981 to -990 (1995); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1121-
1127 (1977 & Supp. 1992); see also THOMAS J. SCHOENBAuM & RONALD H. RO-
SENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES AND READINGS 293 (3d
ed., 1996) ("About 20 states have environmental policy acts modeled after NEPA.").
216. See Michael Wheeler, Negotiating NIMBYs: Learning from the Failure of the
Massachusetts Siting Law, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 241, 284-88 (1994) (proposing alternate
models of intermunicipal regional negotiation). See generally MICHAEL O'HARE,
FACILITY SITING AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION (1983) (describing the powerful participation
of opposition groups in most attempts to site environmentally sensitive land uses and




burdens. Indeed, the decision not to leave a community reveals
something about the relationship between the perceived burdens im-
posed by a challenged facility and the benefits derived from
remaining in the community. While these decisions may reflect op-
tions constrained by lack of mobility or discrimination in the housing
market, they nonetheless provide some guidance concerning prefer-
ences among available choices.
b. Public Choice Theory and Limitations on the Legitimacy of
the Representative Process
In addition to challenging the extent of information available to
minority communities, environmental racism scholars allege that mi-
nority communities have less access to the expertise necessary to
combat an undesirable siting proposal, are less organized than their
non-minority counterparts, and lack the financial resources and per-
sonnel required to sustain a long-term protest. 21  This criticism
resonates with themes underlying public choice theory, questioning
the power of the political process to measure and implement prefer-
ences legitimately."'
Public choice theorists argue that collective judgments are not
likely to represent a coherent revelation of public will, or even the
culmination of informed and informative debate. Rather, public
choice theory condemns the very notion of a coherent public will, and
portrays the political process as an exercise in rent-seeking behavior
by specially organized subgroups. 19 Relying on this theory of social
choice, environmental racism scholars may claim that even if minori-
ties have a representative number of voices participating in the siting
decision, the voices of others in the debate are heard more clearly.
The experience of successful minority organization around envi-
ronmental equity issues belies this assertion. The outpouring of
support on a local, state, and national level for the Afton uprising in
1982 is but one example of the power of minority (primarily African-
American) social action organizations. Like the civil rights groups of
217. See BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 3, at 14-16.
218. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65
TEX. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) (posing the "ultimate issue" of public choice as "whether leg-
islatures can claim to formulate public policy legitimately").
219. The way public choice theory characterizes the power of interest groups in the
democratic process can be traced to Mancur Olson's theory of collective action. See
MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECrIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS passim (1965); see also GEORGE J, STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE
STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION passim (1975) (exploring the ways the public adopts a
policy to facilitate the economic analysis of the creation and effects of regulation).
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the past, environmental equity activists often emerge out of these es-
tablished organizations, as well as black churches.m It has been
suggested that the emergence of a sustainable movement in black
communities depends on whether those communities possess "(1)
certain basic resources, (2) social activists with strong ties to mass-
based indigenous institutions, and (3) tactics and strategies that can
be effectively employed against a system of domination.""
In fact, minority groups have been able to capitalize on the les-
sons of public choice theory. While the Afton uprising did not
succeed in blocking the disposal of PCBs in Warren County, other
minority communities have successfully organized and rejected the
placement of environmentally sensitive land uses in their communi-
ties. In Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices from the
Grassroots," Professor Bullard relates the stories of nine minority
community action groups that emerged to confront perceived envi-
ronmental problems. Overall, the grassroots organizations were
highly successful. Citizens of West Dallas, Texas, succeeded in clos-
ing down a lead smelter and obtained a $450 million out-of-court
settlement against the smelter on behalf of 370 children and 40 prop-
erty owners.'m While community activist groups in Alsen, Louisiana,
Houston, Texas, and Richmond, California, failed to force the clo-
sures of the environmentally sensitive land uses in their communities,
they did extract concessions involving capacity reductions and emis-
sion controls.2A Citizens' action groups halted construction of two
proposed hazardous waste facilities in East Los Angeles, and the citi-
zens of Kettleman City, California, succeeded in blocking, for the
time being at least, the construction of a hazardous waste incinerator
in their community.'m
3. Imperfect Information and Process Failures
Environmental equity advocates also point to the lack of infor-
220. Cf. Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black; Brown, Red and Poisoned, in
UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR,
supra note 2, at 53, 61-63 (discussing the advantages of organizing within a common cul-
ture).
221. See ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT:
BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 282 (1984).
222. Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the Environmental
Justice Movement, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE
GRASSROOTS 15,26-39 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993).
223. See id. at 36.
224. See id. at 37.
225. See id. at 29, 32, 37.
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mation available to minorities and the poor as a cause of the dispro-
portionate siting of environmentally sensitive land uses in poor and
minority communities. This argument takes one of two forms. The
first possibility is that developers deliberately or negligently withhold
information from the target community concerning the nature of
their proposed projects. The second possibility is that the informa-
tion is available to the host communities, but is not assimilated by the
residents of that community.
At first blush, both of these charges appear damning. Whether
the proximity to the environmentally sensitive land use is being allo-
cated through the market or through the political process, lack of
information seriously undermines our confidence that the distributive
decisions reflect rational preferences. Market-based neoclassical
economics relies on the assumption that each market participant
bases her conclusion that the transaction will maximize her welfare
on full information about the transaction. 6 In addition, both theo-
ries of law and economics and civic republicanism seem to depend on
full information.' Under the public choice model, the problem of
special rent-seeking groups arises primarily out of differing incentives
to obtain information as between small special interest groups and
the diffused public. Similarly, the civic republican model suggests
that deliberation on issues of the public good will be enhanced by
widespread dissemination of information, increasing the capacity of
diverse groups to join the political debate. 9 Finally, whatever can be
said about the ample opportunities afforded for participation in the
decision-making process, one might imagine that participation with-
out adequate information would be futile or even counterproductive.
A closer read, however, cautions against rushing to judgment
226. See CASE & FAIR, supra note 175, at 465.
227. See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive
Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 917, 934-38 (1990). According to
Professor Fitts:
The law-and-economics approach emphasizes the utilitarian value of informa-
tion-its ability to reveal productive or exchange opportunities for furthering
means/end rationality. Civic virtue, on the other hand, views the elucidation of
opinions primarily as serving a value-based function, leading people (by the ex-
change of information and ideologies) to recognize the bias of their own
positions, and to change their preferences or values-that is, to help identify
ends.
Id.
228. See a at 928.
229. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1557
(1988) ("[R]epublicans envision [the government] process as the forum in which alterna-
tive perspectives and additional information are brought to bear.")
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about the importance of the information gap. To be sure, relevant
information should be available to all interested participants in the
decision-making process, and concerns that information is hidden
should be fully addressed. Beyond the circumstance of deception,
however, the community's failure to become fully informed about the
risks and benefits of environmentally sensitive land uses does not
necessarily indicate a failure of the market or the political process.
Forming judgments without full information is neither always ir-
rational nor always a bar to rational decision-making. As an initial
matter, a decision not to acquire full information may itself reflect a
rational allocation of resources. We all make many decisions without
going to the effort to become fully informed. Most of these are rela-
tively trivial, and may not justify the investment in full information.
Others are more important, but we may not have the time to collect
the relevant information. The mere choice whether to become.fully
informed is itself a choice bounded by scarcity. In communities
where incomes are low, the allocation of resources to subsistence may
leave little time or energy for engaging in local politics or becoming
educated concerning the issues raised by the potential siting of envi-
ronmentally sensitive land uses.m While scholars may lament the
choices made by the residents of the host communities, bald refer-
ences to the problem of "lack of information" will not address the
time and resource constraints which resulted in the decision to re-
main uninformed.
Moreover, in many circumstances perfectly rational decisions are
made based on imperfect information. At least in the standard two
party-political process, limited information may serve as an impor-
tant device for improving reasoning processes, overcoming certain
perverse interest group incentives, and avoiding political stalemate."
These lessons may well apply in the context of decision-making con-
cerning environmentally sensitive land uses, information about which
tends to be complicated, controversial, and subject to manipulation
by special interest groups-both proponents and opponents of the
siting.
Finally, even if the information gap is assumed to be a process
failure that should be corrected, that correction would not necessarily
230. The incentive to gather information may be further diluted by the complexity of
siting decisions and the simplicity of the signal that most private participants in a siting
process can send: permit the facility or not. See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some
Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 767
(1990).
231. See Fitts, supra note 227, at 939-55.
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lead to a redistribution of environmentally sensitive land uses away
from minority neighborhoods. The misinformation or lack of infor-
mation shared by residents of potential host communities may lead to
unnecessary and unwise opposition to environmentally sensitive land
uses, as well as to unreflective acquiescence. z2
B. Interfering with Accurately Measured Preferences
Even where process failures do not undermine our confidence
that an exchange enhances private welfare, collective judgments may
nonetheless reject (presumably accurate) preferences that are re-
vealed through market transactions. Based on utilitarian or rights-
based rationales, society interferes with accurately revealed prefer-
ences in essentially four circumstances: (1) when it is determined
that certain members of society should be guaranteed access to cer-
tain goods and/or services; (2) when private preferences are invidious
or otherwise contrary to community values; (3) when the fulfillment
of private preferences causes harm to others; and, (4) when the ful-
fillment of private preferences causes socially unacceptable harm to
the individual. In addition, in light of emerging insights into the per-
vasive influence that social policy may have on the formation of
private preferences, legal scholars are beginning to challenge policy
makers to reconsider the presumptive legitimacy of private prefer-
ences in many circumstances.23
1. Removing Decisions from the Market or Political Spheres
Even in the absence of identifiable process failures, one can ar-
gue that society should remove the decisions that lead to the
distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses from the market
and the political process altogether. That is, we may wish to prevent
individuals from exchanging health for job opportunities and com-
munities from trading health risks for social benefits.
To be sure, society does remove some decisions from the politi-
cal and/or market realm altogether. By collective judgment, society
may express "preferences about preferences" (second-order prefer-
ences) through which the majority voluntarily forecloses certain
options from the menu of available market or political choices.2 The
232. See infra text accompanying notes 259-71 (discussing the limits of rational evalua-
tion of risky alternatives).
233. See, e.g., Sunstein, Legal Interference, supra note 100, at 1131 (arguing that the
legal system should "not take private preferences as exogenous variables").
234. See id. at 1140.
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Constitution represents one of the most interesting types of disabling
collective judgments: the judgment that we should bind ourselves in
the present to prohibit the implementation of certain of our collective
judgments in the future." An important safeguard of this document
is the guarantee of equal protection, which prohibits the collective
decisionmaker from implementing determinations based on classifi-
cations we consider invidious or objectionable.
Race-based discrimination is one such classification. If the claim
of environmental racism were based on allegations that siting deci-
sions were made in the political arena on the basis of the race of the
host community, the constitutional violation would be clear and the
only uncertainties to be resolved would be issues of proof.26  As
noted above, however, most environmental equity activists do not
allege that siting decisions have been made on the basis of invidious
criteria. Rather, they challenge the allegedly disproportionate impact
of facially neutral policy choices and market transactions.
As an analog to political precommitment strategies, society may
collectively decide to remove certain allocative or distributive deci-
sions from the market altogether, expressing a second order
preference for decommodification of the good or service. Although
the justifications for removing certain commodities from the market
realm 7 are diverse and hotly debated," many commodities none-
235. Much has been written about these types of collective judgments, or
"precommitment strategies." See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 66-103 (1979); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE
AND CONSEQUENCE 236 (1984); Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, supra note 93, at 24-
27.
236. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 268-71 (1977)
(remanding an equal protection claim of housing discrimination in light of Washington v.
Davis' requirement of intentional discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239
(1976) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when official conduct dis-
criminates on the basis of race). The several environmental racism challenges raised in
federal court under the equal protection clause have faltered on the shoals of the intent
requirement. See, e.g, East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County
Plan. & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 885-87 (M.D. Ga.) (no evidence of "improper
racial animus"), affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt.
Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (insufficient evidence of intent to discriminate),
affd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986); NAACP v. Gorsuch, No. 82-768-CIV-
5, order at 9 n.8 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 1982) ("There is not one shred of evidence that race
has at any time been a motivating factor for any decision taken by any official-state,
federal or local-in this long saga.").
237. Removal of a commodity from the market realm can be distinguished from other
types of collectively imposed prohibitions on alienability, such as prohibitions on the
transfer of a commodity by any means, including by gift. Some narcotics are subject to
such a prohibition, as is the transfer of one's right to vote. See Radin, supra note 107, at
1854. It is not clear whether an environmental justice argument premised on inalienabil-
[Vol. 75
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
theless cannot be traded in the traditional market sense."9 Children
(both their beings and their labor), whole blood, human organs, fetal
gestational services, and sexual services are among the goods and
services for which market transactions have been prohibited. Other
goods, such as narcotics, are consigned to a very limited, highly
regulated market realm.
However, it cannot credibly be argued that society should pre-
commit to prohibiting all market-based risk-related exchanges.
Precommitment strategies entail the considerable cost of loss of
autonomy to those in the community who would prefer not to be
bound, and thus can be justified only under a limited set of condi-
tions.4 Moreover, if the costs of the prohibition to dissenters are
great enough, the prohibition will fail, as is illustrated by the robust
market for illegal drugs. Finally, industrialized society relies on the
willingness to exchange health and safety risks for benefits. Without
such tradeoffs, buildings and bridges could not be built,241 industries
could not hire workers,242 and leisure activities would be severely re-
stricted.
Of course, we can, and should, commit to reducing the health
and safety risks imposed by industrialization as much as is feasible
and wise. And we should not feel compelled to respect the autonomy
of the most risk-taking among us. The appropriate level of risk
regulation may well be an inefficient one, through which society re-
distributes resources in order to "purchase" increased safety for
those individuals and communities who would otherwise be willing to
ity would require absolute inalienability or only non-commodification.
238. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 1-5 (1981) (suggesting
that all scarce resources should be ownable and alienable and applying that theory to non-
market behavior); see also Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 970, 990 (1985) ("Rules restraining alienation are best accounted for, both posi-
tively and normatively, by the need to control problems of external harm and the
common pool."). Compare Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienablility and the Theory of Prop-
erty Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 932-33 (1985) (proposing three normative rationales
for inalienabilities: economic efficiency, "certain specialized distributive goals," and in-
compatibility of unfettered market processes with the responsible functioning of the
democratic state) with Radin, supra note 107, at 1852 (advocating a "non ideal, pragmatic
evaluation of market-inalienabilities based on a conception of personhood or human
flourishing that differs from a that of traditional liberalism or economics").
239. See Radin, supra note 107, at 1855-56.
240. See Donald A. Dripps, Precommitmen4 Prohibition, and the Problem of Dissent,
22 . LEGAL STUD. 255,256 n.5 (1993).
241. See MCGARrFY & SHAPIRO, supra note 92, at 4-5 (discussing construction fatali-
ties in seven industrialized countries).
242. See id. (estimating that as many as 12,000 persons per year may die in industrial
accidents).
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exchange unacceptable levels of risk for jobs or other benefits.243 So-
ciety has already committed to this regulatory structure, imposing
significant restrictions on the location, design, and operation of envi-
ronmentally sensitive land uses. Environmental justice advocates
may fruitfully argue that we have not done enough to reduce the
risks, but they cannot credibly argue that we should eliminate these
risks altogether.
2. Guaranteed Minimums and Egalitarian Distribution
With respect to some essential goods and services, our society
has maintained the market-based distribution system but has made
an effort to provide a safety net beneath it. Food, housing, and medi-
cal care are the primary goods for which our society has attempted to
establish a minimum level of access. Women, infants, and children
receive in-kind transfers of nutritionally appropriate foodstuffs
through the WIC program and families with dependent children are
eligible to receive food stamps; the extremely poor have access to
medical care through state-administered Medicaid programs; and the
federal government subsidizes the construction of some "affordable"
housing, 4 and the rental of private units under the Section 8 Existing
Housing Certificate Program2'5 Legal interference with private pref-
erences in this manner may reflect either a collective commitment to
a more egalitarian distribution of certain resources than the market
process would permit, or a rights-based commitment to a certain
minimal allocation of certain resources, or both. It is possible to
shoe-horn environmental justice claims into this category. Environ-
mental equity activists, in essence, seek a more egalitarian
distribution of access to "clean" air, water, and surroundings. There
exists, however, a fundamental difference between environmental
243. See id. at 296-97.
244. The public housing program for low-income residents was established in the
Wagner-Steagall Housing Act. See Wagner-Steagall Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-
412,50 Stat. 888 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437(a)-(j) (1994)); Michael H. Schill, Privatiz-
ing Federal Low-income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL
L. REV. 878, 894 (1990). Due to the ensuing world war, however, few units were con-
structed under that statute. Schill, supra, at 895. The Housing Act of 1949 authorized the
construction of 810,000 public housing units, which were not completed until 1972. See id.
As of 1990, 1.3 million units of public housing existed in the United States. See id. at 897.
245. Under Section 8, participating households identify privately owned rental prop-
erty which meets minimum safety standards and rents for less than the federally
prescribed maximum rent. If the household and the rental unit qualify, the residents pay
no more than 30% of their incomes in rent, and the federal government pays the remain-
der of the rent. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f) (1994); see also Schill, supra note 244, at 899-900
(describing the Section 8 program).
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equity claims and the paradigm cases of redistribution of essential
resources-the former entails an implicit tradeoff that does not exist
in the latter. When society distributes food more equitably by pro-
viding food stamps or in-kind transfers, the redistribution does not
entail a net loss for the recipients.24 The same is true in the context
of housing subsidies or free medical services. In the environmental
equity context, however, it is either possible or likely that forced re-
distribution of a clean environment would require communities to
give up benefits (i.e., jobs, tax revenues, etc.) which may outweigh the
value of the redistributed resource.
3. Unacceptable Risk of Harm to Self or Others
In other circumstances, we interfere with market exchanges,
even though they appear to maximize welfare, when fulfillment of the
private preferences will cause harm to others or a socially unaccept-
able level of harm to self. Accordingly, we establish safety standards
in the workplace, and require employers to adhere to those stan-
dards, even if they are able to entice some employees to work under
riskier conditions.247 Many communities establish minimum health
and safety standards for residential property, and prevent landlords
and tenants from agreeing to lease substandard housing, even for re-
duced rents.' Environmental equity advocates might attempt to rely
on this category to justify massive intervention with the market and
political process. However, their focus on distributive equity instead
of enhanced health and safety regulation ultimately condemns this
attempt to failure.
Existing environmental protection statutes provide a robust ex-
ample of society's rejection of private decisions that are likely to
246. To be sure, the form in which our society redistributes food may entail a net loss
to society in efficiency terms, as most non-cash transfers do. In addition, a food stamp
recipient is constrained in the manner in which she can legally exchange the food stamps
for goods, which entails a sacrifice of autonomy. However, food stamps are made avail-
able to low-income families, not imposed upon them. If the limitations on consumption
autonomy imposed on food stamp recipients is not outweighed by the increased consump-
tion made possible by the stamps, then the eligible individual need not make the
exchange.
247. For a thorough description of the laws regulating workplace safety, and a persua-
sive argument that these laws are poorly drawn and strikingly underprotective, see
MCGARrrY & SHAPiO, supra note 92, passim.
248. See, e.g., Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984) (enforcing the housing code
through an implied warranty of habitability). For a review of the theoretical and empiri-
cal literature concerning the consequences forcing these minimum standards, see Roger
A. Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habitability in Residential
Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URBAN L. ANN. 3, 138-53 (1979).
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cause harm (or risk of harm) to others or unacceptable risk of harm
to self. While many view environmental protection statutes merely
as tools to internalize externalities, most environmental protection
statutes are not intended simply to ameliorate inefficient resource
allocations, but also to reject even efficient decisions that result in an
unacceptable level of harm or risk of harm. 9 For example, the Clean
Air Act is principally a technology-forcing statute that requires the
EPA to establish primary and secondary national ambient air quality
standards for criteria air pollutants at a level which protects the pub-
lic health with an adequate margin of safety, without regard to the
efficiency of the standard.' Because these standards are established
with regard to regional air quality, they discourage the undue concen-
tration of emissions in any given area.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's regulations
concerning the standards for treatment and disposal of hazardous
wastes are similarly aspirational."1 RCRA imposes a detailed mani-
fest system on generators and transporters of hazardous wastes, and
regulates the treatment, storage, and disposal of such wastes. The act
prohibits land disposal of hazardous wastes except in those circum-
stances where (1) the wastes are treated prior to disposal with the
"best demonstrated treatment technology;" or (2) the EPA grants an
249. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balanc-
ing Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
159, 161 (1983). Thomas McGarity argues that:
the general preference of Congress and especially of implementing agencies for
the technology-based approach in the context of the chemical industry is war-
ranted by an almost universal recognition that citizens of this country have a
'right' to a healthy environment and workplace, at least insofar as the societal
pursuit of that right is not technologically impossible or prohibitively expensive.
In addition, administrative procedures for developing risk information incorporate
many conservative biases, and "most approved procedures tend to overstate the actual
risk." W. Kip VisCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PuBLIC AND PRIvATE RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR RISK 156 (1992) ("[Iin regulating toxic substances .... results from the most sensitive
animal species are often used, and government agencies such as the EPA routinely focus
on the upper end of the 95 percent confidence interval as the risk level rather than use the
mean of the distribution.").
250. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994); McGarity, supra note 249, at 164.
251. The central objective of the 1984 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments to the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act was to minimize or eliminate the land disposal
of hazardous wastes.
[Certain classes of land disposal facilities are not capable of assuring long-term
containment of certain hazardous wastes, and to avoid substantial risk to human
health and the environment, reliance on land disposal should be minimized or
eliminated, and land disposal, particularly landfill and surface impoundment,
should be the least favored method for managing hazardous wastes ....
42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(7) (1994).
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exemption to the prohibition based on a showing that the proposed
disposal methodology meets exacting health and safety standards. 2
For the waste that is disposed of on land, RCRA sets stringent design
and performance standards for landfills to prevent leaking and re-
quires ongoing monitoring of the groundwater surrounding the
facility5
3
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) directed the EPA to cleanup
pre-RCRA old and abandoned hazardous waste sites.' CERCLA
eliminated many of the common law constraints on apportioning re-
sponsibility for the clean-ups, establishing strict joint and several
liability and greatly reduced causation criteria. While Congress ex-
pressly disavowed an intent to return all areas to pristine levels, it did
require that CERCLA cleanup actions be "consistent with [a] per-
manent remedy.., to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous
substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to
present or future public health or welfare or the environment." 5
Other federal statutes limit construction of environmentally sen-
sitive land uses in certain areas as a result of geologic, geographic, or
atmospheric conditions in the area. The Clean Water Act, for exam-
ple, regulates the discharge of fill material into wetlands.5 6 Under
that statute, in order to construct any facility on land characterized by
wetlands vegetation and the presence of hydrolic soil, landowners
generally must obtain a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers, which is required to evaluate the proposed project for its
impact on the wetlands5"
Some environmental equity advocates purport to encourage
widespread interference with the market and the political process out
of concern that many siting decisions are resulting in unacceptable
risk of harm. In doing so, however, they somehow shift their focus
252. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(d)(1), 6924(m).
253. For example, RCRA requires double liners, leachate collection systems, and a
sophisticated system of groundwater monitoring. See 42 U.S.C. § 6co24(o).
254. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
255. Erin Sheridan, How Clean is Clean: Standards for Remedial Actions at Hazardous
Waste Sites under CERCLA, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.. 9, 18-19 (1986-87).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
257. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994). Exceptions to the permit requirement exist, such
as when the Corps has issued a general or a nationwide permit that encompasses the proj-
ect. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1); 33 C.F.R. § 330.6 (1995). General permits are issued on a
regional basis and authorize activities that will have minimal individual or cumulative
adverse environmental effects, while nationwide permits authorize relatively small-scale
activities that are determined to involve little if any impact on the environment. See id.
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away from the continued existence of environmentally sensitive land
uses and the failure of existing environmental protection statutes to
ensure the health and safety of those living nearby, to the existing
distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses. If an environ-
mentally sensitive land use is unacceptably risky in a poor and/or
minority community, it should be just as unacceptably risky in a pre-
dominately wealthy and/or white neighborhood. Thus, as long as
environmental equity advocates are calling for a redistribution of en-
vironmentally sensitive land uses, they cannot convincingly rest their
argument on society's obligation to reject private preferences or col-
lective judgments that result in unacceptable levels of risk.2
4. Risk and the Limits of Rationality
Z9
Whether acting as a policymaker, democratic deliberator, or
market participant, to form a rational preference concerning residen-
tial proximity to environmentally sensitive land uses one must be
capable of rationally evaluating information involving risk and uncer-
tainty. It can be argued that the human mind is so challenged by this
task that society should not privilege the measured preferences that
depend on such evaluations. In particular, if humans cannot mean-
ingfully evaluate the burdens imposed by potential exposure to
environmental risks, it is nonsensical to suggest that residential
proximity to such risks represents the rational choice of the residents
of a host community. Unfortunately, at some point society must
evaluate the burdens imposed by potential exposure and make judg-
ments about whether they outweigh the benefits of the offending
facility. The real question is whether this determination should be
made by individuals in the market, or collectively through the politi-
cal process. And, if we decide that collective judgments are more
accurate or otherwise more acceptable, we must decide at what
level-local, state, or national-these judgments should be made.
Most people rely on established heuristics to aid in their evalua-
tion of risks, and these heuristics systematically skew lay perceptions
of risk.' Most of us are incapable of engaging in rigorous statistical
258. Professor Elizabeth Chambliss has pointed out that the very determination of
what risks are unacceptable may be influenced by the racial and class characteristics of
the neighborhoods most likely to play host to a particular land use. This troubling possi-
bility raises complex issues that go beyond the scope of this paper, but which may, if
explored, better support claims of environmental racism than any arguments advanced
thus far by environmental equity advocates.
259. "[D]ecisions involving risks illustrate the limits of human rationality ....
VIscusI, supra note 249, at 150.
260. See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology
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analysis of risk-related information. Instead, we form perceptions of
and compare risks by grounding available information in a system of
heuristics, in order to translate complex and confusing information
into conclusions upon which we can act. For example, lay persons
tend to overestimate low probability events and underestimate high
probability events.' In addition, by relying on the "availability"
heuristic, people judge an event as likely or frequent if past instances
or similar events are easy to imagine or recall. 2" Because availability
is affected by factors unrelated to frequency, such as dramatic media
coverage of a recent potential, or barely averted, disaster, people
tend to overestimate the probability that certain catastrophic events
will occur.' Studies also suggest the existence of a status quo bias, or
reference risk effect, which leads people to underestimate current
risk levels and to overestimate the benefits of preventing an increase
of risk from its current level.2" As a result, new sources of risk may
be more strictly regulated than are old technologies and familiar
risks. Finally, people's perceptions of the riskiness of a proposed en-
deavor are extraordinarily malleable, and can be altered by the
manner in which information concerning the proposal and its risks
are presented. People tend to be risk seeking if the proposed uncer-
tain outcomes are framed as possible gains from the status quo, but
risk averse if they are framed as possible losses.' These common
cognitive errors-which can cause a significant gap between objec-
tively measured and perceived risk-tend to be pervasive and
robust.2" This gap arguably eliminates the rationality underlying the
for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 750, 753-55, 777 (1990); Paul Slovic et al.,
Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEuRisncs AND BIAsES 463,464-72 (Daniel Kahmeman et al. eds., 1982); Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIAsES 1, 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982) (discussing various established heuristics used to assess probabilities, and the prob-
lems leading to inaccurate results).
261. See VISCUSI, supra note 249, at 117; Noll & Krier, supra note 260, at 754-60.
262. See Slovic et al., supra note 260, at 465-72.
263. Even a vivid disaster film or a warning of a tragic but extraordinarily unlikely
consequence of a relatively safe activity can trigger the availability heuristic, and lead to
gross overestimation of the risk attendant the activity. See id. at 465.
264. See VISCusi, supra note 249, at 143.
265. See Daniel Kabneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effec Loss Aversion, and
Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991), reprinted in RICHARD H. THALEN, THE
WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 63 (1992). Most
risky endeavors can be described either way. For example, a community of 55,000 that
proposes to host a nuclear power plant can portray the emergency evacuation plan as one
that is likely to save 50,000 lives in the event an evacuation is necessary or one that is
likely to be unable to effectuate the rapid evacuation of at least 5,000 people.
266. See Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On
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privileged status of private preferences.
In particular, decisions concerning residential proximity to envi-
ronmentally sensitive land uses are precisely the type in which the
most recognized heuristics may drastically distort the evaluative
process. But this information does not necessarily advance the cause
of the environmental justice movement. The heuristics described
above suggest that individuals may systematically over-estimate the
risk associated with residential proximity to environmentally sensi-
tive land uses. Environmentally sensitive land uses often involve low
probabilities of catastrophic events, while details of the possible con-
sequences of those accidents may be graphically presented by
opponents of the project, and accidents that do occur (such as the
leak at Three Mile Island) tend to be widely publicized and thus
readily "available." Accordingly, the many successful community
vetoes of environmentally sensitive land uses might be better ex-
plained as irrational than the relatively few instances of community
invitation to an environmentally sensitive land use. In light of the
conservative biases incorporated into the commonly observed heuris-
tics for evaluating risks, environmental justice advocates have a
substantial hurdle to overcome to demonstrate that we should inter-
fere with choices made by the individual or the community to protect
them from unacceptable risk or from their own mistakes.
While lay perceptions of risk may be systematically biased, ex-
pert assessments are not necessarily better. Experts are not immune
from the cognitive discrepancies that plague lay risk assessments,
267
and "scientific" risk assessments may omit certain values that society
(or at least individuals) perceive to be inextricable from rational
evaluations of risk. Expert risk assessment, for example, does not
distinguish between risks that are voluntarily assumed and those that
are not, or between risks that are evenly distributed and those that
are targeted to a specific subpopulation." Yet studies confirm that
people make value judgments between these different contexts in
which identical risks may arise, and that these value judgments are
not based on cognitive errors concerning the objective probability of
the risk, but on consistent recognition that these values matter as a
the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 260, at 129, 144-49 (discussing the
resilience of erroneous risk perceptions even in the face of evidence that should under-
mine the original perceptions).
267. See Kenneth R. Hammond et al., Improving Scientists' Judgments of Risk, in
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 466,467-68 (Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth R. Hammond
eds., 1986).
268. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 118, at 55-59.
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way to distinguish between otherwise equivalent risks."9
The divergence between lay and expert evaluations of risk does
not condemn the quest for rationality in the decision-making con-
cerning environmentally sensitive land uses. However, lay
misperceptions undermine our confidence in private preferences as
an indicator of social welfare. And merely increasing the information
provided to lay persons and increasing their opportunities to partici-
pate in the decision-making will not necessarily enhance the
rationality of the process." Moreover, the sterility of expert judg-
ments calls into question our ability to substitute these judgments for
private preferences in a normatively acceptable manner.
Mechanisms may exist by which people can be better informed
and educated out of their biases, and experts can be made to consider
"non-scientific" risk values.7' If environmental equity advocates are
striving for more rational allocation and distribution of environmen-
tally sensitive land uses, they must seek out these mechanisms and
suggest their implementation.
5. Endogenous Preferences and the Role of Social Policy
Much has been written lately of the constructed nature of private
preferences. One's perception of one's wants and needs is highly
contingent on cultural clues such as available information, current
consumption patterns, legal rules, perceived options, and social pres-
sures.' Recognition of the endogenous nature of private preferences
calls into question all three of the commonly accepted bases for lim-
iting the circumstances in which society should interfere with
accurately measured private preferences. If preferences can be re-
shaped through the provision of more information, opportunities,
and altered social pressures, then it will not be futile to attempt such
an interference. And, if existing private preferences are formed with
incomplete information in response to limited options and inappro-
priate social pressures, one cannot readily say that the fulfillment of
those preferences best serves our goal of promoting individual
autonomy.'m Finally, the very concept of maximizing social welfare
269. See id. at 57-58.
270. See Noll & Krier, supra note 260, at 764-65,772.
271. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 118, at 90-91 (suggesting that deliberative proc-
esses may be found for exchanging expert and lay ideas about risk).
272. See Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, supra note 92, at 10.
273. See id. at 11-12 ("If preferences are a product of available information, existing
consumption patterns, social pressures, and governmental rules, it seems odd to suggest
that individual freedom lies exclusively or by definition in preference satisfaction, or that
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through the aggregate satisfaction of private preferences becomes
unstable in light of our understanding of the socially constructed na-
ture of those preferences. Accordingly, scholars are increasingly
comfortable arguing that policies should be designed not merely to
maximize social utility within the given universe of preference pro-
files, but also to reshape that universe, in order that the emerging
preferences be even more compatible with a shared vision of social
welfare.' r
In the case of environmentally sensitive land uses, the operative
cultural constraint on preferences appears to be income class. In par-
ticular, in the context of all market-based decision-making, one's
preferences are inextricably entwined with one's allocative starting
point. This is clear from our models of the market: willingness to
pay requires the ability to pay, and those with more resources can
purchase freedom from proximity to environmentally sensitive land
uses. In arguing that "black, rural, and poor" citizens of Sumter
County had no real choice but to embrace the Emelle facility, and are
dependent on the landfill for economic survival, environmental jus-
tice proponents Conner Bailey and Charles E. Faupel allude to the
difficulties engendered when preferences respond primarily to class
clues.275
The recent experience of the residents of Richmond, California
is consistent with this insight. Recall that Richmond developed
around and because of heavy industry that would be, in many com-
munities, locally undesirable. By the early 1990s much of this
industry was undesirable to some residents of Richmond as well, and
residents pressured Chevron, the largest industrial presence in the
area, to decrease emissions and establish a buffer zone around the
facility. Much of the rhetoric of this pressure raised allegations of
environmental racism. Ultimately, however, the opposition groups
reached a settlement with Chevron that traded the company's con-
tinued physical presence for, primarily, an increased financial
presence. Chevron agreed to hire more local employees, to assist in
the creation of a job training program, to donate park space and a
bike path, and to provide other much needed community goods and
current preferences should, on grounds of autonomy, be treated as the basis for settling
political issues.").
274. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 103, at 20 ("It is not paternalistic,
or an illegitimate interference with competing conceptions of the good, for a democracy
to promote scrutiny and testing of preferences and beliefs through deliberative proc-
esses.").
275. See Bailey & Faupel, supra note 130, at 140-43.
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services in exchange for the support of the organized residents *2
6
To suggest that these individuals and communities simply be
barred from fulfilling their (albeit endogenous) preferences, without
adjusting the cultural conditions that serve to limit their economic
options, would simply decrease the welfare of minorities and the poor
even more. Aspirational policies aimed at adjusting endogenous
preferences, even if ultimately successful, directly interfere with a
citizen's attempt to fulfill rationally formed preferences in the short
run, in the hopes of altering those preferences over time. The inter-
ference is, by definition, costly to the citizen. She has determined
how best to meet her needs and wants, and is precluded from doing
so in order that those needs and wants will be reshaped. If these
short-term costs outweigh the long-term benefits, the policy is proba-
bly unwise. In any event, the costs ought not be imposed lightly on a
group that is, ostensibly, being saved from disadvantage.
None of the proposed solutions to the "environmental racism"
problem directly confront the difficulty of determining when the so-
lution will in fact increase the well-being of those affected (that is,
when the solution will replicate what the communities would have
chosen in a world where we are more confident that individual pref-
erences are freely chosen). If the preferences for residential
proximity to environmentally sensitive land uses are accurately
measured by the market and political processes, the fact that they are
endogenous and can be transformed by legal interference does not
mean that the government should veto the community's attempts to
fulfill the preference, or that we should permit vocal minorities
within a community to veto the collective preference. Unless we
change the conditions that lead residents to believe that trading
proximity for financial benefits enhances their welfare, then merely
vetoing the expressed preference leaves the communities worse off
than would fulfilling it.
V. PRESCRIPrnONS
As Professor Been has pointed out, the enviconmental racism
movement cannot make a coherent call for environmental equity un-
til its members develop and adopt a concrete theory of what counts
as "fair" in the distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses.'
Nor can advocates or activists convincingly call for reform of the cur-
rent system of allocating and distributing environmental risks without
276. Press release on file with the author.
277. Been, Fairness, supra note 15, at 1008-09,1027-68.
1996]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
anchoring those reforms in a credible theory demonstrating why the
existing distribution of, and mechanisms for distributing, these risks
should be rejected.
A. Regulating Risks
The foundational premise of an enlightened society's willingness
to allocate and distribute risky enterprises based on private prefer-
ences expressed in the market and political system must be a firm
commitment to establishing minimum health and safety standards
beneath which individual and community choices must not fall. Some
might argue that our system of environmental protection establishes
the threshold at an acceptable levelY8 Others would surely disagree.
The adequacy of our environmental standards, however, is not a mat-
ter of racial justice.
Some environmentally sensitive land uses might be too danger-
ous to be sited near anyone. The risks entailed may be so great that
nobody should have to live near the site. How to determine which
environmental hazards are too dangerous to be permitted near resi-
dential areas is beyond the scope of this article, but the remedies
indicated by that determination are clear. If dangerous sitings are
permitted because environmental standards are too lax, those stan-
dards should be raised. If certain types of environmentally sensitive
land uses cannot be made safe enough to be sited in residential areas,
then such sitings should be prohibited 9 In such circumstances, the
appropriate solution is to prohibit residential proximity to the envi-
ronmentally sensitive land use altogether, not to site the uses more
"equitably."
Moreover, the accumulation of hazardous sitings in one place
might transform a relatively innocuous placement into an unreasona-
bly dangerous one. Such a situation calls for more dispersed location
of environmentally sensitive land uses, not because the existing dis-
tribution is "racist" or "inequitable," but because dispersion is
necessary to prevent avoidable and unacceptable harm.
Even acceptable levels of regulatory protection will be ineffec-
278. Cf. MCGARrrY & SHAPIRO, supra note 92, at 293-304 (stating that "fa]mong the
several health and safety agencies that Congress created in the 1960s and early 1970s, the
Environmental Protection Agency ... has been one of the most successful," and urging
Congress to model the Occupational Safety and Health Administration after the EPA).
279. Of course, poor and/or minority residents may still wish to migrate into residen-
tial proximity to a hazardous site. If the site has been removed from residential areas




tive, however, if the safeguards are not adequately enforced. Propos-
als to ensure adequate enforcement of environmental protection
statutes and to encourage residents of host communities to take ad-
vantage of citizen suit provisions to enhance compliance' are
laudable regardless of the community in which the offending facility
is found.
At the same time, it is possible that disparate enforcement prac-
tices (within established limits ensuring adequate protection of health
and safety) would inure to the benefit of poor and/or minority com-
munities. The current debate over the development of brownfields
illustrates this possibility, and, perhaps, provides a microcosm of the
environmental racism debate.
Brownfields are generally defined as abandoned, inactive, or un-
derutilized industrial sites which suffer from some form of
environmental contamination resulting from the normal operating
procedures of the prior industry, but which are not so contaminated
that they have been placed on the National Priority List for cleanup
under CERCLA." 1 It has been estimated that there may be as many
as 500,000 brownfields in the United States.' Most brownfields are
located in industrialized or formerly industrialized urban areas.'
The consequences of the decentralization of industry, combined
with the broader deindustrialization of the generally occurring in the
United States in 1970s and 1980s, have been devastating for many
urban areas.2 Brownfields constitute urban blight, pose potential
environmental hazards, and represent lost opportunities for inner city
economic development.
280. See Eileen Guana, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and In-
centives on the Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1995) (suggesting
amendments to or alternative interpretations of federal environmental protection statutes
to facilitate use of citizen suit provisions by poor and minority citizens).
281. See R. Michael Sweeney, Brownfields Restoration and Voluntary Cleanup Legis-
lation, 2 ENvTL. LAW. 101, 106-07 (1995).
282. See Bernard A. Weintraub & Sy Gruza, The Redevelopment of Brownsites, 9 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 57 (1995); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PUB. No. OTA-
BT-ETI-153, STATE OF THE STATES ON BROWNFIELDS: PROBLEMS FOR CLEANUP AND
REUSE OF CONTAMINATION SITES 2 (1995) (estimating that the number of brownfield
sites may range from "tens of thousands to 450,000").
283. See ELIZABETH GELTMAN, INDENTIFYING BROWNFIELDS LIABILTY ISSUES:
DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIPTION WITH SUPERFUND REFORM 4 (June 28, 1995) (a report
to the Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States).
284. See Georgette C. Poindexter, Addressing Morality in Urban Brownfield Redevel-
opment: Using Stakeholder Theory to Craft Legal Process, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 37, 39-45
(1995) (detailing the urban distress caused by the declining manufacturing base and the
flight of the remaining industrial jobs to the suburbs).
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Many business and legal experts blame the expansive liability
provisions of CERCLA for the proliferation of brownfields.2 In par-
ticular, virtually any entity that has owned or operated a site since its
initial contamination, or who transported waste to the site, may be
liable for the full costs of cleaning up any hazardous waste release
associated with the site.s Moreover, CERCLA cleanup standards
are both uncertain and inflexible: CERCLA requires, cryptically,
that remediation comply with federal and state standards that are
"applicable or relevant and appropriate"' but does not permit flexi-
bility in cleanup standards to reflect potential future uses of the
property.' In light of this potentially unlimited and uncertain liabil-
ity, s9 developers have opted to abandon the inner cities, and to locate
new industries in suburban "greenfields"-previously undeveloped
areas that are unlikely to give rise to CERCLA liability.
In response to these perceived disincentives, the EPA ° and
many states 9' have implemented programs intended to encourage
redevelopment of brownfields. The EPA initiative permits the
agency to enter into a prospective purchaser agreement, including a
covenant not to sue, if the agreement offers the EPA some direct
benefit in terms of cleanup costs coupled with substantial indirect
benefits to the community in which the site is located.2' These indi-
285. See Sweeney, supra note 281, at 105-06; Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Commit-
tee on Environment and Public Works, 104th Cong. (1996), available in 1996 WL
10162794) (Statement of Carol M. Browner, Administrator, U.S. EPA).
286. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d
1550, 1553-54 (11th Cir. 1990); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893
F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990).
287. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (1994); see William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Vol-
untary Contamination Cleanup Approvals, Incentives, and the Costs of Interminable
Liability, 80 MINN. L. REV. 35, 46-47 (1995) ("A firm fix on what would be considered a
sufficient cleanup is virtually impossible. . . without a site-specific evaluation by govern-
ment officials; CERCLA cleanup standards in application are highly variable and subject
to discretionary judgments, and thus yield unpredictable results.").
288. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) (1994).
289. If a site is not on the NPL, CERCLA provides no mechanism by which potentially
responsible parties can determine their liability status or what type of cleanup would be
legally sufficient to eliminate liability. See Buzbee, supra note 287, at 61-66.
290. See Guidance on Settlements with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Prop-
erty, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792 (1995).
291. Many states have their own remediation legislation that is stricter than CERCLA.
Moreover, states are empowered to carry out remedial activities under CERCLA. See 42
U.S.C. § 9621(e)(2).
292. See Guidance on Settlements with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Prop-
erty, 60 Fed. Reg. at 34,793-94. The previous guidelines did not permit consideration of
indirect benefits. See Guidance on Landowner Liability under Section 107(a) (1) of CER-
CLA, De Minimis Settlements Under Section 122(g)(1)(B) of CERCLA, and Settlements
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rect benefits include the creation or retention of jobs, restoration of
abandoned or blighted property, provision of an important commu-
nity service, and measures that serve to reduce the environmental or
health risks posed by the site.23
Some state brownfield initiatives go even further, by introducing
flexibility into the cleanup criteria.294 Under these initiatives, a site
that is to be redeveloped for industrial use may not require as exten-
sive or permanent treatment as one that is to be revitalized for
residential purposes. Because the EPA generally defers to state en-
forcement decisions concerning CERCLA, a state's decision to
encourage a voluntary cleanup under flexible criteria essentially
shields the developer from federal enforcement actions.
Brownfields initiatives have engendered a debate in the envi-
ronmental community that mirrors the environmental racism
controversy. Some activists contend that the development of brown-
fields is in the best interest of impoverished urban minorities,295 while
others argue that the compromises that permit reindustrialization of
these toxic areas represent yet another example of the willingness of
policymakers to sacrifice the health and safety of minority communi-
ties to pursue other expediencies. 6 As with the environmental
justice debate at large, the resolution of these competing claims re-
quires society to clarify its commitment to minimum standards of
health and safety and confront our continued reliance on market so-
lutions to tragic choices.
B. Enhancing Opportunities for Participation
Process failures undermine our confidence in the accuracy of the
outcomes of the market and political process. Accordingly, few
would disagree that society should continue to strive to identify situa-
tions in which people are actually prevented by institutional barriers
from participating in political decision-making and proceed to dis-
mantle those barriers. In that regard, no community should be
empowered to impose unacceptably burdensome externalities on
with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,241 (1989).
293. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 34,794.
294. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 13.32(1) (1994).
295. See, e.g., James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Racism, Site Cleanup, and Inner City
Jobs: Indiana's Urban In-fill Incentives, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 43, 56-57 (1994) (praising
Indiana's voluntary cleanup program).
296. See, e.g., Samara F. Swanston, An Environmental Justice Perspective on Superfund
Reauthorization, 9 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COMMENT. 565, 569-71 (1994) (arguing that proposals
to adopt flexible cleanup standards will put poor and minority communities at further risk
of exposure to environmental hazards).
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others in order to benefit from residential proximity to environmen-
tally sensitive land uses."' If a particular land use is locally beneficial
but poses significant risks for those outside the host community, then
those affected by the risk should be included in some way in the deci-
sion-making process.
Proposals designed to ensure that potential host communities
have access to ample accurate information concerning proposed fa-
cilities, and that this information is presented in a comprehensible
manner, seem unobjectionable. However, if documented heuristics
bias risk assessments exist among lay persons as suggested by the cur-
rent literature, the increased access to information will not
necessarily lead to more rational decision-making.
Moreover, attempts to equalize opportunities to participate be-
tween wealthy and poor communities seem doomed to failure. As an
initial matter, an enormous amount of resources would have to be
devoted to meeting that goal, given the disparities in wealth and in-
come in our society. Short of massive redistribution of wealth, the
competing demands placed on the time and energy of poor citizens
will continue to ensure that wealthier communities exert more influ-
ence in policymaking than their poorer counterparts.
Finally, the focus on outcome-empowering minority and poor
communities to oppose most or all sitings-is decidedly ill-advised.
A continued focus on increased public participation as a means to
exercise the community veto power will enshrine existing environ-
mentally sensitive land uses for which the new sites would substitute.
Because new sites are almost always more heavily regulated and safer
than old sites, this tactic seems imprudent. If new facilities are not
built, the old ones will remain open. These old, unregulated sites are
the very ones that communities claim are disproportionately sited.298
297. See Robert W. Collin, Review of the Legal Literature on Environmental Racism,
Environmental Equity, and Environmental Justice, 9 J. ENVrL. L. & LITIG. 121, 163-65
(1994) (discussing the implications of the siting of a commercial solid waste landfill on the
Campo Band reservation in southern California).
298. The sites evaluated in the GAO, CJR, and Bullard studies are old, pre-RCRA
sites. According to Michael Gerrard, only one new off-site hazardous waste landfill has
opened on a new site, and remained open, since the enactment of RCRA in 1976. Mi-
chael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.. 495, 514 (1994). It is
located in Last Chance, Colorado, an area where the population is 97% white. See id. In
addition, even though hazardous waste incineration is the preferred method of waste dis-
posal, only a few new hazardous waste incinerators are currently operational, and
communities are succeeding in blocking the construction of new ones. See id. Hazardous
waste continues to be produced as a by-product of industrialized production. We can and
should attempt to reduce it. However, attempting to do so by decreasing development of




Several scholars have suggested that environmental equity issues
are best addressed by providing adequate compensalion for the bur-
dens imposed by environmentally sensitive land uses on host
communities.'2 While many environmental equity activists decry
compensated siting proposals as immoral, compensation is probably
the only solution that has any relevance to the underlying cause of
current distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses. That is, if
the distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses is influenced
primarily by the constraints arising from the underlying distribution
of income and opportunities in our society, compensation can make
some contribution toward reducing those constraints.
If the compensation model is intended to provide a host com-
munity with sufficient benefits to outweigh the costs of the
challenged facility, proponents of the reform must begin by identify-
ing the market or political process failures that have distorted the
community's ability to make a rational tradeoff without the provision
for compensation. Our general reliance on private preferences
measured in the market and political process would indicate that, if
the facility can be sited without mandated compensation, the benefits
of the facility itself adequately compensate the residents of the host
community for the burdens the facility imposes.
Absent such a showing, compensation simply represents an at-
tempt to decrease, to some small extent and with respect to a
particular good, the disparities in wealth and opportunities that make
us so uncomfortable about allocating environmentally sensitive land
uses through the market in the first place. Rather than constituting
an immoral buy-off of the residents of a host community, compensa-
tion can be understood as a mechanism for increasing the otherwise
limited options faced by poor and minority communities and resi-
dents. In this context, compensation can be used to finance the
option most environmental racism scholars say is fatally lacking in
siting decisions: the opportunity to leave the community if one does
not agree with the risk/benefit analysis that led to the siting in the
hazard, shortsighted, and potentially risky enterprise.
299. See, e.g., MICHAEL O'HARE ET AL., FACILITY SITING AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION
67-87 (1983); Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Ra-
dioactive Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL.
L. REv. 1047 (1994); Arthur M. Sullivan, Victim Compensation Revisited. Efficiency Ver-
sus Equity in the Siting of Noxious Facilities, 41 J. PUB. ECON. 211 (1990).
300. See, e.g., BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 3, at 91 (challenging the
practice of "pay[ing] those who are less fortunate to accept risks that others can afford to
escape").
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first place. If one cause of society's rejection of a community's pref-
erences is lack of mobility among residents, compensation can
eliminate or at least reduce to a tolerable level that influence. Com-
pensation is especially appropriate in circumstances where the siting
causes a decline in the value of the dissatisfied residents' houses, be-
cause those houses probably represent the largest asset of the
residents. 1 Moreover, compensation based solutions help cure the
social choice ills, by returning the decision to the market. While the
compensation remedy does not fully address the limits of rationality
in dealing with certain types of risk, it at least eliminates or reduces
the distortions added by the introduction of the political process into
the risk assessment.
Of course, if it makes sense to pay residents of host communities
to enable them to escape residential proximity to environmentally
sensitive land uses, then, logically, we should also pay all those non-
residents to whom the community seems more attractive once it
becomes a host community, to ensure that unacceptable endogenous
preferences do not lead them to migrate to the community. And why
stop with environmentally sensitive land uses? Ultimately, compen-
sation in this limited context will only reduce by a small fraction the
vast disparities in wealth that drive the market and political forces
underlying the allocation and distribution of environmentally sensi-
tive resources.
D. The Problem with Prohibitions
The most problematic response to concerns about the inequita-
ble distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses is prohibiting
the siting of such uses. Alabama has already forbidden the siting of
more than one commercial waste facility in any given county,' and
the City Charter of New York requires that undue concentration of
environmentally sensitive land uses be avoided.'o
None of the theories that might support interference with private
preferences concerning the allocation and distribution of environ-
mentally sensitive land uses justify prohibitory reforms. The effect of
301. In 1989, Dow Chemical presented the residents of Morrisonville, Louisiana a
voluntary buy-out and relocation plan, because the Dow facilities had grown so close to
the community that public safety was endangered. Ninety-five percent of the residents
accepted Dow's offer. See Clarice E. Gaylord & Geraldine W. Twitty, Protecting Endan-
gered Communities, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771,775-76 (1994).
302. See ALA. CODE § 22-30-5.1(c) (1987).
303. See New York City Planning Comm'n, Criteria for the Location of City Facilities
art. 5.1 (Dec. 3, 1990).
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such reforms is to further limit the options available, to poor and mi-
nority communities, thereby exacerbating the problems underlying
the current distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses. To
the extent that the existing distribution of environmentally sensitive
land uses reflects rational preferences shaped primarily by economic
constraints, it is unlikely that prohibitions on the siting of environ-
mentally sensitive land uses in minority or poor communities will
serve the best interests of the affected populations. Blocking the sit-
ing of environmentally sensitive land uses in a particular community
based on a perception that the community is already disproportion-
ately burdened may prevent the community from making a trade-off
that-to the community and its residents-results in a net benefit.
VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps environmental justice advocates have bitten off more
than they can chew, or at least more than they had hoped to swallow.
The existing distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses can-
not cavalierly be attributed to vaguely articulated market failures or
breakdowns of the political process. Rather, environmental equity
scholars must come to terms with the enormous implications of what
they advocate: the potential wholesale interference with the accu-
rately measured preferences of minorities and the poor with respect
to residential proximity to environmentally sensitive land uses. If the
existing distribution of environmentally sensitive land uses accurately
reflects the measured, rational preferences of minority and poor
communities, then society should be wary of interfering with at-
tempts to fulfill those preferences. If extensive interference with
these preferences is based on the perceived indeterminacy of prefer-
ence measurement in the context of environmentally sensitive land
uses, then the appropriate responses must evolve from that basis, and
will differ dramatically from those currently advanced by environ-
ment equity activists.
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